When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts
Annotation
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Weitere beteiligte Personen: | |
| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
MIT Press
Jan. 2003
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Philosophical Psychopathology Ser
|
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7218.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy |
| Zusammenfassung: | Annotation |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (212 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 0262284308 9780262284301 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000Mi 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-260-MPOB-7218 | ||
| 003 | MaCbMITP | ||
| 005 | 20190503073432.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr |n||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 160810e20030124riu o 000 0 eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 0262284308 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780262284301 | ||
| 024 | 3 | |a 9780262284301 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Stephens, G. Lynn | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a When Self-Consciousness Breaks |b Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b MIT Press |c Jan. 2003 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (212 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt | ||
| 337 | |b c | ||
| 338 | |b cr | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Philosophical Psychopathology Ser | |
| 520 | 8 | |a Annotation |b In this book, G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham examine verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of what they call "alienated self-consciousness." In such cases, a subject is directly or introspectively aware of an episode in her mental life but experiences it as alien, as somehow attributable to another person. Stephens and Graham explore two sorts of questions about verbal hallucinations and thought insertion. The first is their phenomenology -- what the experience is like for the subject. The second concerns the implications of alien episodes for our general understanding of self-consciousness. Psychopathologists look at alien episodes for what they reveal about the underlying pathology of mental illness. As philosophers, the authors ask what they reveal about the underlying psychological structure and processes of human self-consciousness. The authors suggest that alien episodes are caused by a disturbed sense of agency, a condition in which the subject no longer has the sense of being the agent who thinks or carries out the thought. Distinguishing the sense of subjectivity from that of agency, they make the case that the sense of agency is a key element in self-consciousness. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Graham, George | |
| 966 | 4 | 0 | |l DE-91 |p ZDB-260-MPOB |q TUM_PDA_MPOB |3 MIT Press |u https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7218.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-260-MPOB | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-260-MPOB | ||
| 049 | |a DE-91 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | ZDB-260-MPOB-7218 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1821493839714582529 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Stephens, G. Lynn |
| author2 | Graham, George |
| author2_role | |
| author2_variant | g g gg |
| author_facet | Stephens, G. Lynn Graham, George |
| author_role | |
| author_sort | Stephens, G. Lynn |
| author_variant | g l s gl gls |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localTUM |
| collection | ZDB-260-MPOB |
| format | eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02008cam a2200277Mi 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-260-MPOB-7218</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">MaCbMITP</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20190503073432.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr |n|||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160810e20030124riu o 000 0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0262284308</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780262284301</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780262284301</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stephens, G. Lynn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">When Self-Consciousness Breaks</subfield><subfield code="b">Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">MIT Press</subfield><subfield code="c">Jan. 2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (212 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Philosophical Psychopathology Ser</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Annotation</subfield><subfield code="b">In this book, G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham examine verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of what they call "alienated self-consciousness." In such cases, a subject is directly or introspectively aware of an episode in her mental life but experiences it as alien, as somehow attributable to another person. Stephens and Graham explore two sorts of questions about verbal hallucinations and thought insertion. The first is their phenomenology -- what the experience is like for the subject. The second concerns the implications of alien episodes for our general understanding of self-consciousness. Psychopathologists look at alien episodes for what they reveal about the underlying pathology of mental illness. As philosophers, the authors ask what they reveal about the underlying psychological structure and processes of human self-consciousness. The authors suggest that alien episodes are caused by a disturbed sense of agency, a condition in which the subject no longer has the sense of being the agent who thinks or carries out the thought. Distinguishing the sense of subjectivity from that of agency, they make the case that the sense of agency is a key element in self-consciousness.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Graham, George</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-260-MPOB</subfield><subfield code="q">TUM_PDA_MPOB</subfield><subfield code="3">MIT Press</subfield><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7218.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-260-MPOB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-260-MPOB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | ZDB-260-MPOB-7218 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-17T11:04:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262284308 9780262284301 |
| language | English |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
| owner_facet | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (212 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-260-MPOB TUM_PDA_MPOB ZDB-260-MPOB |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateSearch | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Philosophical Psychopathology Ser |
| spelling | Stephens, G. Lynn When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts Cambridge MIT Press Jan. 2003 1 Online-Ressource (212 Seiten) txt c cr Philosophical Psychopathology Ser Annotation In this book, G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham examine verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of what they call "alienated self-consciousness." In such cases, a subject is directly or introspectively aware of an episode in her mental life but experiences it as alien, as somehow attributable to another person. Stephens and Graham explore two sorts of questions about verbal hallucinations and thought insertion. The first is their phenomenology -- what the experience is like for the subject. The second concerns the implications of alien episodes for our general understanding of self-consciousness. Psychopathologists look at alien episodes for what they reveal about the underlying pathology of mental illness. As philosophers, the authors ask what they reveal about the underlying psychological structure and processes of human self-consciousness. The authors suggest that alien episodes are caused by a disturbed sense of agency, a condition in which the subject no longer has the sense of being the agent who thinks or carries out the thought. Distinguishing the sense of subjectivity from that of agency, they make the case that the sense of agency is a key element in self-consciousness. Graham, George |
| spellingShingle | Stephens, G. Lynn When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title | When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title_auth | When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title_exact_search | When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title_full | When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title_fullStr | When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title_full_unstemmed | When Self-Consciousness Breaks Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| title_short | When Self-Consciousness Breaks |
| title_sort | when self consciousness breaks alien voices and inserted thoughts |
| title_sub | Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stephensglynn whenselfconsciousnessbreaksalienvoicesandinsertedthoughts AT grahamgeorge whenselfconsciousnessbreaksalienvoicesandinsertedthoughts |