Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness:
Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, th...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
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| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
©2001
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| Schriftenreihe: | The Jean Nicod lectures
1999 |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4077.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy |
| Zusammenfassung: | Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, the history of the mind-body problem is, in part, the slow victory of physical monism over various forms of dualism. Each new version of dualism claims that surely something more is going on with us than the merely physical.In this book Perry defends a view that he calls antecedent physicalism. He takes on each of three major arguments against physicalism, showing that they pose no threat to antecedent physicalism. These arguments are the zombie argument (that there is a possible world inhabited by beings that are physically indiscernible from us but not conscious), the knowledge argument (that we can know facts about our own feelings that are not just physical facts, thereby proving physicalism false), and the modal argument (that the identity of sensation and brain state is contingent, but since there is no such thing as contingent identity, sensations are not brain states). |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 221 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 0262281414 0262661357 9780262281416 9780262661355 |
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| spelling | Perry, John 1943- Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness John Perry ©2001 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 221 Seiten) txt c cr The Jean Nicod lectures 1999 Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, the history of the mind-body problem is, in part, the slow victory of physical monism over various forms of dualism. Each new version of dualism claims that surely something more is going on with us than the merely physical.In this book Perry defends a view that he calls antecedent physicalism. He takes on each of three major arguments against physicalism, showing that they pose no threat to antecedent physicalism. These arguments are the zombie argument (that there is a possible world inhabited by beings that are physically indiscernible from us but not conscious), the knowledge argument (that we can know facts about our own feelings that are not just physical facts, thereby proving physicalism false), and the modal argument (that the identity of sensation and brain state is contingent, but since there is no such thing as contingent identity, sensations are not brain states). CogNet library. Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 0262161990 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262161992 |
| spellingShingle | Perry, John 1943- Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness |
| title | Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness |
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| title_full_unstemmed | Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness John Perry |
| title_short | Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness |
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