Mathematics is (mostly) analytic:
This Element outlines and defends an account of analyticity according to which mathematics is, for the most part, analytic. The author begins by looking at Quine's arguments against the concepts of analyticity. He shows how Quine's position on analyticity is related to his view on explicat...
Gespeichert in:
Beteilige Person: | |
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Format: | E-Book |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2024
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Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of mathematics
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Links: | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009109925 |
Zusammenfassung: | This Element outlines and defends an account of analyticity according to which mathematics is, for the most part, analytic. The author begins by looking at Quine's arguments against the concepts of analyticity. He shows how Quine's position on analyticity is related to his view on explication and shows how this suggests a way of defining analyticity that would meet Quine's own standards for explication. The author then looks at Boghossian and his distinction between epistemic and metaphysical accounts of analyticity. Here he argues that there is a straightforward way of eliminating the confusion Boghossian sees with what he calls metaphysical accounts. The author demonstrates that the epistemic dimension of his epistemic account is almost entirely superfluous. The author then discusses how analyticity is related to truth, necessity, and questions of ontology. Finally, he discusses the vagueness of analyticity and also the relation of analyticity to the axiomatic method in mathematics. |
Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (61 Seiten) |
ISBN: | 9781009109925 |
ISSN: | 2399-2883 |
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spelling | Lavers, Gregory Mathematics is (mostly) analytic Gregory Lavers Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2024 1 Online-Ressource (61 Seiten) txt c cr Cambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of mathematics 2399-2883 This Element outlines and defends an account of analyticity according to which mathematics is, for the most part, analytic. The author begins by looking at Quine's arguments against the concepts of analyticity. He shows how Quine's position on analyticity is related to his view on explication and shows how this suggests a way of defining analyticity that would meet Quine's own standards for explication. The author then looks at Boghossian and his distinction between epistemic and metaphysical accounts of analyticity. Here he argues that there is a straightforward way of eliminating the confusion Boghossian sees with what he calls metaphysical accounts. The author demonstrates that the epistemic dimension of his epistemic account is almost entirely superfluous. The author then discusses how analyticity is related to truth, necessity, and questions of ontology. Finally, he discusses the vagueness of analyticity and also the relation of analyticity to the axiomatic method in mathematics. Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009111119 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009507363 |
spellingShingle | Lavers, Gregory Mathematics is (mostly) analytic |
title | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic |
title_auth | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic |
title_exact_search | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic |
title_full | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic Gregory Lavers |
title_fullStr | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic Gregory Lavers |
title_full_unstemmed | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic Gregory Lavers |
title_short | Mathematics is (mostly) analytic |
title_sort | mathematics is mostly analytic |
work_keys_str_mv | AT laversgregory mathematicsismostlyanalytic |