Escalation in the war in Ukraine: lessons learned and risks for the future
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
2023
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| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2800/RRA2807-1/RAND_RRA2807-1.pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034727393&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Abstract: | Despite the devastating losses experienced by the Russian military and both the Ukrainian military and civilian population following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both sides have refrained from pursuing several escalatory options to date. Although Russia has escalated its attacks on Ukraine in several ways, including strikes against critical infrastructure and the civilian population, it has refrained from other options--notable given the high stakes for the Kremlin and the potential capabilities Russia could bring to bear in the conflict. However, if Russian territorial, personnel, and materiel losses continue to mount without improvements on the battlefield, President Vladimir Putin will face an unpalatable set of choices. In the extreme, the conflict offers plausible scenarios for Russia to become the first state to use nuclear weapons in warfare since 1945. This report evaluates the potential for further escalation in the conflict in Ukraine, including the prospects for escalation to Russian nuclear use. It does so by evaluating Russian and Ukrainian behavior in the conflict to date and identifying and assessing the escalation options still open to both sides. The report is intended to inform U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policymakers as they consider how to avoid further escalation of the conflict while assisting Ukraine in its efforts to defeat the Russian invasion and to better inform the public debate around these issues |
| Umfang: | xv, 91 Seiten 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781977411662 1977411665 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Learning About Russian Escalation Decisions from the Conflict -- Chapter Three: Future Escalation in the War in Ukraine -- Chapter Four: Conclusions and Implications | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Despite the devastating losses experienced by the Russian military and both the Ukrainian military and civilian population following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both sides have refrained from pursuing several escalatory options to date. Although Russia has escalated its attacks on Ukraine in several ways, including strikes against critical infrastructure and the civilian population, it has refrained from other options--notable given the high stakes for the Kremlin and the potential capabilities Russia could bring to bear in the conflict. However, if Russian territorial, personnel, and materiel losses continue to mount without improvements on the battlefield, President Vladimir Putin will face an unpalatable set of choices. In the extreme, the conflict offers plausible scenarios for Russia to become the first state to use nuclear weapons in warfare since 1945. This report evaluates the potential for further escalation in the conflict in Ukraine, including the prospects for escalation to Russian nuclear use. It does so by evaluating Russian and Ukrainian behavior in the conflict to date and identifying and assessing the escalation options still open to both sides. The report is intended to inform U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policymakers as they consider how to avoid further escalation of the conflict while assisting Ukraine in its efforts to defeat the Russian invasion and to better inform the public debate around these issues | |
| 648 | 7 | |a Prognose |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Eskalation |0 (DE-588)4153029-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg |0 (DE-588)106969780X |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | 0 | |a Escalation (Military science) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Deterrence (Strategy) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Geopolitics | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Ukraine / History / Russian Invasion, 2022- | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Ukraine / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / Ukraine | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Geopolitical Strategic Competition | |
| 653 | 0 | |a North Atlantic Treaty Organization | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Russia | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Ukraine | |
| 653 | 0 | |a United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Warfare and Military Operations | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Escalade (Science militaire) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Dissuasion (Stratégie) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Géopolitique | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Ukraine / Histoire / 2022- (Invasion russe) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Ukraine / Relations extérieures / Russie | |
| 653 | 0 | |a geopolitics | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819263508657733632 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | References Ali, Idrees, and Phil Stewart, “Ukraine Shouldn’t Use US Weaponry Inside Russia, US General Says,” Reuters, May 25,2023. Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Company, 1971. Barnes, Julian E., Adam Entous, Eric Schmitt, and Anton Troianovski, “Ukrainians Were Likely Behind Kremlin Drone Attack, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, May 24,2023. Barros, George, Kateryna Stepanenko, Thomas Bergeron, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie, “Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, undated. Beauchamp, Zack, “Why Is Putin Attacking Ukraine? He Told Us,” Vox, February 23,2022. Bella, Timothy, “Assassination Plot Against Zelensky Foiled and Unit Sent to Kill Him ‘Destroyed,’ Ukraine Says,” Washington Post, March 2,2022. Belton, Catherine, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020. Betts, Richard K„ Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Brookings Institution Press, 1987. “Biden Warns Putin on Use of WMDs: ‘Don’t, Don’t, Don’t,”’ Voice of America, September 17, 2022. Braithwaite, Alex, and Douglas Lemke, “Unpacking Escalation,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2011. Bugos, Shannon, “Russia Further Pauses New START Inspections,” Arms Control Today, September 2022. “Chinese Envoy Pledges Efforts to Bring CTBT into Force,” Xinhua, September 28,2021. Colby, Elbridge A., and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending
Interpretations, U.S. Army War College Press, February 2013. Courtney, William, “Putin Could Escalate with Nuclear Testing,” The Hill, March 6, 2023. Diaz-Maurin, François, “Russia Suspends New START and Is Ready to Resume Nuclear Testing,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 21,2023. 87
Escalation in the War in Ukraine Posen, Barry R„ Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, Cornell University Press, 1991. Powell, Robert, “The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 75-96. Powell, Robert, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, March 1989, pp. 61-76. Roberts, Brad, “NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent: Fit for Purpose?” SIRIUS Zeitschriftfür strategische Analysen, March 2023. As of July 7,2023: https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Brad-Roberts-english.pdf Rofer, Cheryl, “Nuclear Tests May Be Back on Moscow’s Agenda,” Foreign Policy, May 15,2023. “Russian Mercenary Chief Says He Did Not Intend Coup, Putin Thanks Those Who Stood Down,” Reuters, June 26,2023. Ryan, Kevin, “Why Putin Will Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” Russia Matters, May 17,2023. Sabbagh, Dan, and Luke Harding, “UK Sending Long-Range Storm Shadow Missiles to Ukraine, Says Defence Minister,” The Guardian, May 11,2023. Sagan, Scott D., The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton University Press, 1993. Sanger, David E., and Steven Erlanger, “Allies Pressure Biden to Hasten NATO Membership for Ukraine,” New York Times, June 14,2023. Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960. Schmitt, Eric, “Russian Warplane Hits American Drone over Black Sea, U.S. Says,” New York Times, March 14,2023. Schreck, Adam, “Putin Signs Annexation of Ukrainian Regions as Losses Mount,” Associated Press,
October 5,2022. Sciutto, Jim, “New US Drone Routes Over Black Sea ‘Definitely Limit’ Intelligence Gathering, Says US Official,” CNN, March 28,2023. Sechser, Todd S., “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 4, Fall 2010, pp. 627-660. Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1, Winter 2013, pp. 173-195. Seligman, Lara, “How Biden Got to Yes on F-16s and Ukraine,” Politico, May 22, 2023. 90
References Siebold, Sabine, and Phil Stewart, “Russian Nuclear Strike Likely to Provoke ‘Physical Response,’ NATO Official Says,” Reuters, October 12,2022. Stewart, Phil, and Idrees Ali, “Russia ‘Very Unlikely’ to Use Nuclear Weapons, US Intel Chief,” Reuters, May 4,2023. Sukin, Lauren, “Rattling the Nuclear Saber: What Russia’s Nuclear Threats Really Mean,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 4,2023. Sytas, Andrius, “Estonia Says It Repelled Major Cyber Attack After Removing Soviet Monuments,” Reuters, August 18,2022. Toosi, Nahal, “The Line Biden Won’t Cross on Ukraine,” Politico, February 23, 2022. Toosi, Nahal, and Lawrence Ukenye, “Russian Jet’s Collision with U.S. Drone Sparks Diplomatic Flurry,” Politico, March 14,2023. Treisman, Rachel, “Putin’s Claim of Fighting Against Ukraine ‘Neo-Nazis’ Distorts History, Scholars Say,” NPR, March 1,2022. Ven Bruusgaard, Kristin, “How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, February 6,2023. Vernon, Will, and Thomas Spender, “Kremlin Drone: Zelensky Denies Ukraine Attacked Putin or Moscow,” BBC News, May 3,2023. von der Burchard, Hans, “Germany Approves Tank Sales to Ukraine, Bowing to Pressure,” Politico, April 26,2022. Warrick, Joby, “A Legacy of ‘Secrecy and Deception’: Why Russia Clings to an Outlawed Chemical Arsenal,” Washington Post, March 19,2022. 91 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München
|
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| author | Frederick, Bryan Cozad, Mark R. Stark, Alexandra |
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| contents | Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Learning About Russian Escalation Decisions from the Conflict -- Chapter Three: Future Escalation in the War in Ukraine -- Chapter Four: Conclusions and Implications |
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| id | DE-604.BV049400134 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T20:11:02Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781977411662 1977411665 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034727393 |
| oclc_num | 1418690059 |
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| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xv, 91 Seiten 23 cm |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20240209 |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND Corporation |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Frederick, Bryan Cozad, Mark R. Stark, Alexandra Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Learning About Russian Escalation Decisions from the Conflict -- Chapter Three: Future Escalation in the War in Ukraine -- Chapter Four: Conclusions and Implications Eskalation (DE-588)4153029-9 gnd Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg (DE-588)106969780X gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4153029-9 (DE-588)106969780X |
| title | Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future |
| title_auth | Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future |
| title_exact_search | Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future |
| title_full | Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, Alexandra Stark |
| title_fullStr | Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, Alexandra Stark |
| title_full_unstemmed | Escalation in the war in Ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, Alexandra Stark |
| title_short | Escalation in the war in Ukraine |
| title_sort | escalation in the war in ukraine lessons learned and risks for the future |
| title_sub | lessons learned and risks for the future |
| topic | Eskalation (DE-588)4153029-9 gnd Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg (DE-588)106969780X gnd |
| topic_facet | Eskalation Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg |
| url | https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2800/RRA2807-1/RAND_RRA2807-1.pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034727393&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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