Staying the unfavorable course: National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
[2023]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Research reports
RR-A808-1 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA808-1 |
| Abstract: | From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 160 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9781977410443 1977410448 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RRA808-1 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission | |
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| author | Sargent, Matthew Campbell, Jason H. Evans, Alexandra T. |
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| id | DE-604.BV049345743 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T20:07:11Z |
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| isbn | 9781977410443 1977410448 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Sargent, Matthew Verfasser (DE-588)1217627588 aut Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans [und drei weitere] National Security Council Decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation [2023] 1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 160 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Research reports RR-A808-1 From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission Afghan War, 2001-2021 / United States National security / United States Terrorism / United States / Prevention Civil-military relations / United States Military policy / Decision making United States / Military policy / Decision making Civil-military relations National security Terrorism / Prevention United States 2001-2021 Campbell, Jason H. Verfasser (DE-588)1189746522 aut Evans, Alexandra T. Verfasser (DE-588)1229697292 aut https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA808-1 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Sargent, Matthew Campbell, Jason H. Evans, Alexandra T. Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_alt | National Security Council Decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_auth | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_exact_search | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_full | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans [und drei weitere] |
| title_fullStr | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans [und drei weitere] |
| title_full_unstemmed | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans [und drei weitere] |
| title_short | Staying the unfavorable course |
| title_sort | staying the unfavorable course national security council decisionmaking and the inertia of u s afghanistan policy 2001 2016 |
| title_sub | National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA808-1 |
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