How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium?: Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2023
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10358 |
| Abstract: | Debt moratoria that allow borrowers to postpone loan payments are a frequently used tool intended to soften the impact of economic crises. This paper reports results from a nationwide experiment with a large consumer lender in India, designed to study how debt forbearance offers affect loan repayment and banking relationships. In the experiment, borrowers receive forbearance offers that are presented either as an initiative of their lender or the result of government regulation. The results show that delinquent borrowers who are offered a debt moratorium by their lender are 4 percentage points (7 percent) less likely to default on their loan, while forbearance has no effect on repayment if it is granted by the regulator. Borrowers who are offered forbearance by their lender also have causally higher demand for future interactions with the lender: in a follow-up experiment conducted several months after the main intervention demand for a non-credit product offered by the lender is 10 percentage points (27 percent) higher among customers who were offered repayment flexibility by the lender than among customers who received a moratorium offer presented as an initiative of the regulator. Overall, the results suggest that, rather than generating moral hazard, debt forbearance can improve loan repayment and support the creation of longer-term banking relationships not only for liquidity but also for relational contracting reasons. This provides a rationale for offering repayment flexibility even in settings where lenders are not required to provide forbearance |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-10358 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a22000001c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049079227 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2023 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-10358 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)091407214 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392144791 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KEP091407214 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Fiorin, Stefano |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? |b Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India |c Stefano Fiorin |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2023 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a Debt moratoria that allow borrowers to postpone loan payments are a frequently used tool intended to soften the impact of economic crises. This paper reports results from a nationwide experiment with a large consumer lender in India, designed to study how debt forbearance offers affect loan repayment and banking relationships. In the experiment, borrowers receive forbearance offers that are presented either as an initiative of their lender or the result of government regulation. The results show that delinquent borrowers who are offered a debt moratorium by their lender are 4 percentage points (7 percent) less likely to default on their loan, while forbearance has no effect on repayment if it is granted by the regulator. Borrowers who are offered forbearance by their lender also have causally higher demand for future interactions with the lender: in a follow-up experiment conducted several months after the main intervention demand for a non-credit product offered by the lender is 10 percentage points (27 percent) higher among customers who were offered repayment flexibility by the lender than among customers who received a moratorium offer presented as an initiative of the regulator. Overall, the results suggest that, rather than generating moral hazard, debt forbearance can improve loan repayment and support the creation of longer-term banking relationships not only for liquidity but also for relational contracting reasons. This provides a rationale for offering repayment flexibility even in settings where lenders are not required to provide forbearance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Consumer DEBT Repayment | |
| 650 | 4 | |a DEBT Forbearance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International Economics and Trade | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Loan Repayment | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Moral Hazard | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Relational Contracting | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Repayment Flexivility Benefits | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Hall, Joseph |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kanz, Martin |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Fiorin, Stefano |t How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India |d Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2023 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10358 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034341118 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 2826142 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1821937213145874432 |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Fiorin, Stefano |
| author_facet | Fiorin, Stefano |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Fiorin, Stefano |
| author_variant | s f sf |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049079227 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)091407214 (OCoLC)1392144791 (DE-599)KEP091407214 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-10358 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03273nam a22004331c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049079227</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2023 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-10358</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)091407214</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392144791</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)KEP091407214</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fiorin, Stefano</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium?</subfield><subfield code="b">Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India</subfield><subfield code="c">Stefano Fiorin</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Debt moratoria that allow borrowers to postpone loan payments are a frequently used tool intended to soften the impact of economic crises. This paper reports results from a nationwide experiment with a large consumer lender in India, designed to study how debt forbearance offers affect loan repayment and banking relationships. In the experiment, borrowers receive forbearance offers that are presented either as an initiative of their lender or the result of government regulation. The results show that delinquent borrowers who are offered a debt moratorium by their lender are 4 percentage points (7 percent) less likely to default on their loan, while forbearance has no effect on repayment if it is granted by the regulator. Borrowers who are offered forbearance by their lender also have causally higher demand for future interactions with the lender: in a follow-up experiment conducted several months after the main intervention demand for a non-credit product offered by the lender is 10 percentage points (27 percent) higher among customers who were offered repayment flexibility by the lender than among customers who received a moratorium offer presented as an initiative of the regulator. Overall, the results suggest that, rather than generating moral hazard, debt forbearance can improve loan repayment and support the creation of longer-term banking relationships not only for liquidity but also for relational contracting reasons. This provides a rationale for offering repayment flexibility even in settings where lenders are not required to provide forbearance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Consumer DEBT Repayment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">DEBT Forbearance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">International Economics and Trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Loan Repayment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Moral Hazard</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Relational Contracting</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Repayment Flexivility Benefits</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hall, Joseph</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Kanz, Martin</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Fiorin, Stefano</subfield><subfield code="t">How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India</subfield><subfield code="d">Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10358</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034341118</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049079227 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T20:00:12Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034341118 |
| oclc_num | 1392144791 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (66 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Fiorin, Stefano How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India Consumer DEBT Repayment DEBT Forbearance International Economics and Trade Loan Repayment Moral Hazard Relational Contracting Repayment Flexivility Benefits |
| title | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India |
| title_auth | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India |
| title_exact_search | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India |
| title_full | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India Stefano Fiorin |
| title_fullStr | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India Stefano Fiorin |
| title_full_unstemmed | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India Stefano Fiorin |
| title_short | How do Borrowers Respond to a Debt Moratorium? |
| title_sort | how do borrowers respond to a debt moratorium experimental evidence from consumer loans in india |
| title_sub | Experimental Evidence from Consumer Loans in India |
| topic | Consumer DEBT Repayment DEBT Forbearance International Economics and Trade Loan Repayment Moral Hazard Relational Contracting Repayment Flexivility Benefits |
| topic_facet | Consumer DEBT Repayment DEBT Forbearance International Economics and Trade Loan Repayment Moral Hazard Relational Contracting Repayment Flexivility Benefits |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10358 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fiorinstefano howdoborrowersrespondtoadebtmoratoriumexperimentalevidencefromconsumerloansinindia AT halljoseph howdoborrowersrespondtoadebtmoratoriumexperimentalevidencefromconsumerloansinindia AT kanzmartin howdoborrowersrespondtoadebtmoratoriumexperimentalevidencefromconsumerloansinindia |