In a bad state: responding to state and local budget crises
In a Bad State provides the first comprehensive history and theory of how the federal government has addressed subnational debt crises. Tracing the long history of public budgeting at the state and local level, David Schleicher argues that federal officials face a "trilemma" when a state o...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY, USA
Oxford University Press
[2023]
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| Links: | https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/hwr/detail.action?docID=7235014 https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/munchentech/detail.action?docID=7235014 |
| Zusammenfassung: | In a Bad State provides the first comprehensive history and theory of how the federal government has addressed subnational debt crises. Tracing the long history of public budgeting at the state and local level, David Schleicher argues that federal officials face a "trilemma" when a state or city nears default. But whether they demand state austerity, permit state defaults, or provide bailouts-and all have been tried-federal officials can only achieve two out of three goals, at best. Authoritative and accessible, this book is a guide to understanding the pressing problems that local, state, and federal officials currently face and the policy options they possess for responding |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (249 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780197629178 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Cover -- In a Bad State -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Why is it so Hard to Get Out of a Bad State? -- Introduction: Why Is It So Hard to Get Out of a Bad State? -- Part II When We've been in a Bad State -- 1. What Has Already Been Said about Federal Responses to State and Local Budget Crises? What Has Been Left Out? -- 1.1. State and Local Governmental Moral Hazard or the Problem of "Soft Budget Constraints" -- 1.2. State Fiscal Crises and Macroeconomic Stabilization -- 1.3. State Budget Crises, Infrastructure, and Development -- 1.4. Avoid Moral Hazard, Alleviate Recessions, and/or Build Infrastructure: Pick Two, But Not Three -- 1.5. Appendix to Chapter 1: Three Methodological Notes -- 2. State Debt Crises through the 1840s -- 2.1. Hamilton, the Assumption of State Debts, and Moral Hazard -- 2.2. The State Debt Crises of the 1830s and 1840s -- 3. The Dual Debt Crises of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century -- 3.1. The Railroad Bond Crises -- 3.1.1. Railroad Bonds in the Courts -- 3.1.2. Railroad Bonds and Local Government Law -- 3.1.3. America's Urban Civic Infrastructure: "The Achievements of Government . . . Rivaled the Feats of the Old Testament God" -- 3.2. The Other Debt Crisis of the 1870s: Southern State Post-Reconstruction Repudiation and the "Odious Debt" Doctrine -- 3.3. Conclusion -- 4. State and Local Debt Crises in the 20th Century -- 4.1. State and Local Fiscal Crises during the Great Depression -- 4.1.1. The Creation of Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy -- 4.1.2. When a State Goes Broke: Arkansas in the 1930s -- 4.2. When Big Cities Go Broke -- 4.2.1. New York City: Ford to City, Drop Dea . . . Well, Wait a Minute -- 4.2.2. Bailouts without Moral Hazard: The Case of Washington, DC -- 5. The Great Recession and State and Local Fiscal Crises | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.1. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act -- 5.2. Build America Bonds -- 5.3. The End of Stimulus and the Rise of the Pension Crisis -- 5.4. Municipal Bankruptcy in the Great Recession and the Puerto Rico Crisis -- 5.4.1. Chapter 9: A Quick Primer -- 5.4.2. Chapter 9 in the Great Recession -- 5.5. Puerto Rico and PROMESA -- 5.6. Conclusion -- 6. COVID-19, the CARES Act, the MLF, and the ARP -- 6.1. Who CARES about States and Cities? -- 6.2. The Municipal Liquidity Facility -- 6.3. The December 2020 Stimulus and the ARP -- 6.4. Conclusion: The Second Draft of History -- Part III Tools for getting out of a Bad State -- 7. An Introduction to the Principles for Responding to State and Local Fiscal Crises -- 8. Building Better Bailouts -- 8.1. Traditional Considerations When Building Bailouts -- 8.1.1. General or Specific? -- 8.1.2. Conditional or Unconditional? -- 8.1.3. Loans or Grants? -- 8.2. Building Better Bailouts: Advancing Prudence, Mixing, and Spreading in Bailout Design -- 8.2.1. Conditions on General State and Local Crisis Aid -- 8.2.2. Conditions on Aid to Specific Jurisdictions in Fiscal Crisis -- 9. Building Better Defaults -- 9.1. Building Better Defaults: Reforms to Chapter 9 -- 9.1.1. Insolvency -- 9.1.2. Preferences -- 9.1.3. Financial Engineering -- 9.1.4. Chapter 9 and Overlapping Local Governments -- 9.2. Building Bigger Defaults: State Governments and Chapter 9 -- 9.3. Appendix to Chapter 9: The Constitutional Status of "Big MAC"s -- 10. Building Better Forms of State and Local Austerity -- 10.1. Separating State and Local Tax Bases -- 10.2. Pension Reform -- 11. Resilience, or Building a Better Federal System -- 11.1. Encouraging Inter-Regional Mobility -- 11.2. The Tentative Case for Keeping the Municipal Bond Interest Tax Exemption -- 11.3. The Efficiency of Infrastructure Spending | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 11.4. Nationalizing Parts of the Welfare State -- Part IV The Conclusion, or Why States are Often Bad -- 12. Why States Are Often Bad -- Notes -- Index | |
| 520 | |a In a Bad State provides the first comprehensive history and theory of how the federal government has addressed subnational debt crises. Tracing the long history of public budgeting at the state and local level, David Schleicher argues that federal officials face a "trilemma" when a state or city nears default. But whether they demand state austerity, permit state defaults, or provide bailouts-and all have been tried-federal officials can only achieve two out of three goals, at best. Authoritative and accessible, this book is a guide to understanding the pressing problems that local, state, and federal officials currently face and the policy options they possess for responding | ||
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| contents | Cover -- In a Bad State -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Why is it so Hard to Get Out of a Bad State? -- Introduction: Why Is It So Hard to Get Out of a Bad State? -- Part II When We've been in a Bad State -- 1. What Has Already Been Said about Federal Responses to State and Local Budget Crises? What Has Been Left Out? -- 1.1. State and Local Governmental Moral Hazard or the Problem of "Soft Budget Constraints" -- 1.2. State Fiscal Crises and Macroeconomic Stabilization -- 1.3. State Budget Crises, Infrastructure, and Development -- 1.4. Avoid Moral Hazard, Alleviate Recessions, and/or Build Infrastructure: Pick Two, But Not Three -- 1.5. Appendix to Chapter 1: Three Methodological Notes -- 2. State Debt Crises through the 1840s -- 2.1. Hamilton, the Assumption of State Debts, and Moral Hazard -- 2.2. The State Debt Crises of the 1830s and 1840s -- 3. The Dual Debt Crises of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century -- 3.1. The Railroad Bond Crises -- 3.1.1. Railroad Bonds in the Courts -- 3.1.2. Railroad Bonds and Local Government Law -- 3.1.3. America's Urban Civic Infrastructure: "The Achievements of Government . . . Rivaled the Feats of the Old Testament God" -- 3.2. The Other Debt Crisis of the 1870s: Southern State Post-Reconstruction Repudiation and the "Odious Debt" Doctrine -- 3.3. Conclusion -- 4. State and Local Debt Crises in the 20th Century -- 4.1. State and Local Fiscal Crises during the Great Depression -- 4.1.1. The Creation of Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy -- 4.1.2. When a State Goes Broke: Arkansas in the 1930s -- 4.2. When Big Cities Go Broke -- 4.2.1. New York City: Ford to City, Drop Dea . . . Well, Wait a Minute -- 4.2.2. Bailouts without Moral Hazard: The Case of Washington, DC -- 5. The Great Recession and State and Local Fiscal Crises 5.1. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act -- 5.2. Build America Bonds -- 5.3. The End of Stimulus and the Rise of the Pension Crisis -- 5.4. Municipal Bankruptcy in the Great Recession and the Puerto Rico Crisis -- 5.4.1. Chapter 9: A Quick Primer -- 5.4.2. Chapter 9 in the Great Recession -- 5.5. Puerto Rico and PROMESA -- 5.6. Conclusion -- 6. COVID-19, the CARES Act, the MLF, and the ARP -- 6.1. Who CARES about States and Cities? -- 6.2. The Municipal Liquidity Facility -- 6.3. The December 2020 Stimulus and the ARP -- 6.4. Conclusion: The Second Draft of History -- Part III Tools for getting out of a Bad State -- 7. An Introduction to the Principles for Responding to State and Local Fiscal Crises -- 8. Building Better Bailouts -- 8.1. Traditional Considerations When Building Bailouts -- 8.1.1. General or Specific? -- 8.1.2. Conditional or Unconditional? -- 8.1.3. Loans or Grants? -- 8.2. Building Better Bailouts: Advancing Prudence, Mixing, and Spreading in Bailout Design -- 8.2.1. Conditions on General State and Local Crisis Aid -- 8.2.2. Conditions on Aid to Specific Jurisdictions in Fiscal Crisis -- 9. Building Better Defaults -- 9.1. Building Better Defaults: Reforms to Chapter 9 -- 9.1.1. Insolvency -- 9.1.2. Preferences -- 9.1.3. Financial Engineering -- 9.1.4. Chapter 9 and Overlapping Local Governments -- 9.2. Building Bigger Defaults: State Governments and Chapter 9 -- 9.3. Appendix to Chapter 9: The Constitutional Status of "Big MAC"s -- 10. Building Better Forms of State and Local Austerity -- 10.1. Separating State and Local Tax Bases -- 10.2. Pension Reform -- 11. Resilience, or Building a Better Federal System -- 11.1. Encouraging Inter-Regional Mobility -- 11.2. The Tentative Case for Keeping the Municipal Bond Interest Tax Exemption -- 11.3. The Efficiency of Infrastructure Spending 11.4. Nationalizing Parts of the Welfare State -- Part IV The Conclusion, or Why States are Often Bad -- 12. Why States Are Often Bad -- Notes -- Index |
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| id | DE-604.BV049019745 |
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| isbn | 9780197629178 |
| language | English |
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| spellingShingle | Schleicher, David In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises Cover -- In a Bad State -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Why is it so Hard to Get Out of a Bad State? -- Introduction: Why Is It So Hard to Get Out of a Bad State? -- Part II When We've been in a Bad State -- 1. What Has Already Been Said about Federal Responses to State and Local Budget Crises? What Has Been Left Out? -- 1.1. State and Local Governmental Moral Hazard or the Problem of "Soft Budget Constraints" -- 1.2. State Fiscal Crises and Macroeconomic Stabilization -- 1.3. State Budget Crises, Infrastructure, and Development -- 1.4. Avoid Moral Hazard, Alleviate Recessions, and/or Build Infrastructure: Pick Two, But Not Three -- 1.5. Appendix to Chapter 1: Three Methodological Notes -- 2. State Debt Crises through the 1840s -- 2.1. Hamilton, the Assumption of State Debts, and Moral Hazard -- 2.2. The State Debt Crises of the 1830s and 1840s -- 3. The Dual Debt Crises of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century -- 3.1. The Railroad Bond Crises -- 3.1.1. Railroad Bonds in the Courts -- 3.1.2. Railroad Bonds and Local Government Law -- 3.1.3. America's Urban Civic Infrastructure: "The Achievements of Government . . . Rivaled the Feats of the Old Testament God" -- 3.2. The Other Debt Crisis of the 1870s: Southern State Post-Reconstruction Repudiation and the "Odious Debt" Doctrine -- 3.3. Conclusion -- 4. State and Local Debt Crises in the 20th Century -- 4.1. State and Local Fiscal Crises during the Great Depression -- 4.1.1. The Creation of Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy -- 4.1.2. When a State Goes Broke: Arkansas in the 1930s -- 4.2. When Big Cities Go Broke -- 4.2.1. New York City: Ford to City, Drop Dea . . . Well, Wait a Minute -- 4.2.2. Bailouts without Moral Hazard: The Case of Washington, DC -- 5. The Great Recession and State and Local Fiscal Crises 5.1. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act -- 5.2. Build America Bonds -- 5.3. The End of Stimulus and the Rise of the Pension Crisis -- 5.4. Municipal Bankruptcy in the Great Recession and the Puerto Rico Crisis -- 5.4.1. Chapter 9: A Quick Primer -- 5.4.2. Chapter 9 in the Great Recession -- 5.5. Puerto Rico and PROMESA -- 5.6. Conclusion -- 6. COVID-19, the CARES Act, the MLF, and the ARP -- 6.1. Who CARES about States and Cities? -- 6.2. The Municipal Liquidity Facility -- 6.3. The December 2020 Stimulus and the ARP -- 6.4. Conclusion: The Second Draft of History -- Part III Tools for getting out of a Bad State -- 7. An Introduction to the Principles for Responding to State and Local Fiscal Crises -- 8. Building Better Bailouts -- 8.1. Traditional Considerations When Building Bailouts -- 8.1.1. General or Specific? -- 8.1.2. Conditional or Unconditional? -- 8.1.3. Loans or Grants? -- 8.2. Building Better Bailouts: Advancing Prudence, Mixing, and Spreading in Bailout Design -- 8.2.1. Conditions on General State and Local Crisis Aid -- 8.2.2. Conditions on Aid to Specific Jurisdictions in Fiscal Crisis -- 9. Building Better Defaults -- 9.1. Building Better Defaults: Reforms to Chapter 9 -- 9.1.1. Insolvency -- 9.1.2. Preferences -- 9.1.3. Financial Engineering -- 9.1.4. Chapter 9 and Overlapping Local Governments -- 9.2. Building Bigger Defaults: State Governments and Chapter 9 -- 9.3. Appendix to Chapter 9: The Constitutional Status of "Big MAC"s -- 10. Building Better Forms of State and Local Austerity -- 10.1. Separating State and Local Tax Bases -- 10.2. Pension Reform -- 11. Resilience, or Building a Better Federal System -- 11.1. Encouraging Inter-Regional Mobility -- 11.2. The Tentative Case for Keeping the Municipal Bond Interest Tax Exemption -- 11.3. The Efficiency of Infrastructure Spending 11.4. Nationalizing Parts of the Welfare State -- Part IV The Conclusion, or Why States are Often Bad -- 12. Why States Are Often Bad -- Notes -- Index |
| title | In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_auth | In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_exact_search | In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_full | In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_fullStr | In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_full_unstemmed | In a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_short | In a bad state |
| title_sort | in a bad state responding to state and local budget crises |
| title_sub | responding to state and local budget crises |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schleicherdavid inabadstaterespondingtostateandlocalbudgetcrises |