The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence
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Beteilige Person: Fredriksson, Per G. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2003
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 03/172
Links:http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
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http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
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http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594/07220-9781451858594.xml
Abstract:This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to resist legal reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency and eliminate corruption. The analysis predicts that in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance are weak. In such countries, corruption is more pervasive and the compliance with regulations is low. The empirical results support the predictions of the model
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (33 p)
ISBN:1451858590
9781451858594