Outcomes-Based Conditionality: Its Role and Optimal Design
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Beteilige Person: Ivanova, Anna (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2006
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/128
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http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/05063-9781451863888/05063-9781451863888/05063-9781451863888.xml
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Abstract:The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
ISBN:1451863888
9781451863888