Political Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Transition Countries
This paper examines whether political connections ease financial constraints faced by firms. Using firm-level data from six Central and Eastern European economies, the paper shows that politically connected firms: (i) have high levels of leverage, (ii) have low levels of profitability, (iii) are les...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2019
|
| Schriftenreihe: | World Bank E-Library Archive
|
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8956 |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper examines whether political connections ease financial constraints faced by firms. Using firm-level data from six Central and Eastern European economies, the paper shows that politically connected firms: (i) have high levels of leverage, (ii) have low levels of profitability, (iii) are less capitalized, (iv) have low marginal productivity of capital, and (v) do not invest more than unconnected firms. Next, the paper shows that connected firms borrow more because they have easier access to credit and that political connections lead to a misallocation of capital. The results are consistent with the idea that political connections distort capital allocation and may have welfare costs |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-8956 |
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| 520 | |a This paper examines whether political connections ease financial constraints faced by firms. Using firm-level data from six Central and Eastern European economies, the paper shows that politically connected firms: (i) have high levels of leverage, (ii) have low levels of profitability, (iii) are less capitalized, (iv) have low marginal productivity of capital, and (v) do not invest more than unconnected firms. Next, the paper shows that connected firms borrow more because they have easier access to credit and that political connections lead to a misallocation of capital. The results are consistent with the idea that political connections distort capital allocation and may have welfare costs | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Bussolo, Maurizio |4 oth | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Panizza, Ugo |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Varghese, Richard |4 oth | |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:40:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2019 |
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| publisher | The World Bank |
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| spellingShingle | Bussolo, Maurizio Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries |
| title | Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries |
| title_auth | Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries |
| title_exact_search | Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries |
| title_full | Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries Maurizio Bussolo |
| title_fullStr | Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries Maurizio Bussolo |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political Connections and Financial Constraints Evidence from Transition Countries Maurizio Bussolo |
| title_short | Political Connections and Financial Constraints |
| title_sort | political connections and financial constraints evidence from transition countries |
| title_sub | Evidence from Transition Countries |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8956 |
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