Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows form...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | World Bank E-Library Archive
|
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7361 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-7361 |
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| id | DE-604.BV048269694 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:40:17Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
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| publisher | The World Bank |
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| series2 | World Bank E-Library Archive |
| spellingShingle | Beath, Andrew Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan |
| title | Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan |
| title_auth | Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan |
| title_exact_search | Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan |
| title_full | Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Beath, Andrew |
| title_fullStr | Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Beath, Andrew |
| title_full_unstemmed | Electoral Rules and Political Selection Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Beath, Andrew |
| title_short | Electoral Rules and Political Selection |
| title_sort | electoral rules and political selection theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan |
| title_sub | Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7361 |
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