Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass
National Bureau of Economic Research
2021
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
no. w28602 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28602 https://www.nber.org/papers/w28602 https://doi.org/10.3386/w28602 |
| Abstract: | Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments |
| Beschreibung: | March 2021 |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource illustrations (black and white) |
| Format: | System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| DOI: | 10.3386/w28602 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions |b Structuring the Sale of Club Goods |c John Asker, Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments | |
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| spelling | Asker, John Verfasser (DE-588)131472941 aut Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods John Asker, Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research 2021 1 Online-Ressource illustrations (black and white) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series no. w28602 March 2021 Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web Patent / (DE-627)09138253X / (DE-2867)10478-4 Zweitpreisauktion / (DE-627)76977413X / (DE-2867)29780-3 Auktionstheorie / (DE-627)091348404 / (DE-2867)10138-0 Wohlfahrtsökonomik / (DE-627)091401550 / (DE-2867)10113-2 Baccara, Mariagiovanna 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)129523569 aut Lee, SangMok Verfasser (DE-588)1025644182 aut National Bureau of Economic Research (DE-588)39157-8 isb X:NBER https://www.nber.org/papers/w28602 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext X:NBER https://doi.org/10.3386/w28602 Resolving-System URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| spellingShingle | Asker, John Baccara, Mariagiovanna 1970- Lee, SangMok Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods |
| title | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods |
| title_auth | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods |
| title_exact_search | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods |
| title_full | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods John Asker, Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee |
| title_fullStr | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods John Asker, Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee |
| title_full_unstemmed | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions Structuring the Sale of Club Goods John Asker, Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee |
| title_short | Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions |
| title_sort | patent auctions and bidding coalitions structuring the sale of club goods |
| title_sub | Structuring the Sale of Club Goods |
| url | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28602 https://doi.org/10.3386/w28602 |
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