The new fourth branch: institutions for protecting constitutional democracy
Twenty-first-century constitutions now typically include a new 'fourth branch' of government, a group of institutions charged with protecting constitutional democracy, including electoral management bodies, anticorruption agencies, and ombuds offices. This book offers the first general the...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2021
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| Schriftenreihe: | Comparative constitutional law and policy
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| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047609 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047609 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047609 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Twenty-first-century constitutions now typically include a new 'fourth branch' of government, a group of institutions charged with protecting constitutional democracy, including electoral management bodies, anticorruption agencies, and ombuds offices. This book offers the first general theory of the fourth branch; in a world where governance is exercised through political parties, we cannot be confident that the traditional three branches are enough to preserve constitutional democracy. The fourth branch institutions can, by concentrating within themselves distinctive forms of expertise, deploy that expertise more effectively than the traditional branches are capable of doing. However, several case studies of anticorruption efforts, electoral management bodies, and audit bureaus show that the fourth branch institutions do not always succeed in protecting constitutional democracy, and indeed sometimes undermine it. The book concludes with some cautionary notes about placing too much hope in these - or, indeed, in any - institutions as the guarantors of constitutional democracy |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 23 Aug 2021) Introduction -- Why a fourth branch - the structural logic -- Why a fourth branch - the functional logic -- Design issues in general -- Design principles in practice - A survey -- Anticorruption investigations - Case studies from Brazil and South Africa -- Electoral commissions - Case Studies from India, the United States, and South Korea -- Audit agencies -- Conclusion |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 186 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9781009047609 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781009047609 |
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| 520 | |a Twenty-first-century constitutions now typically include a new 'fourth branch' of government, a group of institutions charged with protecting constitutional democracy, including electoral management bodies, anticorruption agencies, and ombuds offices. This book offers the first general theory of the fourth branch; in a world where governance is exercised through political parties, we cannot be confident that the traditional three branches are enough to preserve constitutional democracy. The fourth branch institutions can, by concentrating within themselves distinctive forms of expertise, deploy that expertise more effectively than the traditional branches are capable of doing. However, several case studies of anticorruption efforts, electoral management bodies, and audit bureaus show that the fourth branch institutions do not always succeed in protecting constitutional democracy, and indeed sometimes undermine it. The book concludes with some cautionary notes about placing too much hope in these - or, indeed, in any - institutions as the guarantors of constitutional democracy | ||
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| dewey-full | 342/.04 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 342 - Constitutional and administrative law |
| dewey-raw | 342/.04 |
| dewey-search | 342/.04 |
| dewey-sort | 3342 14 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/9781009047609 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV047492362 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:21:02Z |
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| isbn | 9781009047609 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Tushnet, Mark V. 1945- (DE-588)13213893X aut The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2021 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 186 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Comparative constitutional law and policy Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 23 Aug 2021) Introduction -- Why a fourth branch - the structural logic -- Why a fourth branch - the functional logic -- Design issues in general -- Design principles in practice - A survey -- Anticorruption investigations - Case studies from Brazil and South Africa -- Electoral commissions - Case Studies from India, the United States, and South Korea -- Audit agencies -- Conclusion Twenty-first-century constitutions now typically include a new 'fourth branch' of government, a group of institutions charged with protecting constitutional democracy, including electoral management bodies, anticorruption agencies, and ombuds offices. This book offers the first general theory of the fourth branch; in a world where governance is exercised through political parties, we cannot be confident that the traditional three branches are enough to preserve constitutional democracy. The fourth branch institutions can, by concentrating within themselves distinctive forms of expertise, deploy that expertise more effectively than the traditional branches are capable of doing. However, several case studies of anticorruption efforts, electoral management bodies, and audit bureaus show that the fourth branch institutions do not always succeed in protecting constitutional democracy, and indeed sometimes undermine it. The book concludes with some cautionary notes about placing too much hope in these - or, indeed, in any - institutions as the guarantors of constitutional democracy Constitutional law Separation of powers Independent regulatory commissions Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-1-31-651783-3 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047609 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Tushnet, Mark V. 1945- The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy Constitutional law Separation of powers Independent regulatory commissions |
| title | The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy |
| title_auth | The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy |
| title_exact_search | The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy |
| title_full | The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School |
| title_fullStr | The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School |
| title_full_unstemmed | The new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School |
| title_short | The new fourth branch |
| title_sort | the new fourth branch institutions for protecting constitutional democracy |
| title_sub | institutions for protecting constitutional democracy |
| topic | Constitutional law Separation of powers Independent regulatory commissions |
| topic_facet | Constitutional law Separation of powers Independent regulatory commissions |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047609 |
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