Interests, institutions, and information: domestic politics and international relations
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person: Milner, Helen V. 1958- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: [Princeton, New Jersey] Princeton University Press 30. Juni 2020
Schlagwörter:
Links:https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498?locatt=mode:legacy
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214498
Abstract:Interests, Institutions, and Information examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. It shows that it is the outcome of this internal game - not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating - that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists - neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike - have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (XII, 309 Seiten) Diagramme
ISBN:9780691214498
DOI:10.1515/9780691214498