General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms:
Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding "rationally" to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consisten...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1974
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1974 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
91 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding "rationally" to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consistent and feasible. The prices may also be described as "taken": for one reason or another the agents who respond to them consider them as given. The existence of such a state, its optimality, its robustness against free bargaining among agents when there are many of them, its Wliqueness, its stability when price displacements evoke specified adjustments--all these issues have been studied, and continue to be studied in a variety of settings. Slowly the equilibrium investigated begins to incorporate public goods, externalities of certain kinds, differences in agents' information, and infinitely many time periods. The appeal of such results need not be belabored: the equilibrium studied may sustain an optimal resource allocation, and when it does it sus tains it in a manner that appears to be informationally efficient and to accord well with individual incentives. Therefore it is important to extend the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, under which it sustains opti mality, and under which it survives displacements as well as free bargaining among agents |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (XI, 247 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783642658020 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0 |
Internformat
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| 490 | 0 | |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |v 91 | |
| 520 | |a Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding "rationally" to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consistent and feasible. The prices may also be described as "taken": for one reason or another the agents who respond to them consider them as given. The existence of such a state, its optimality, its robustness against free bargaining among agents when there are many of them, its Wliqueness, its stability when price displacements evoke specified adjustments--all these issues have been studied, and continue to be studied in a variety of settings. Slowly the equilibrium investigated begins to incorporate public goods, externalities of certain kinds, differences in agents' information, and infinitely many time periods. The appeal of such results need not be belabored: the equilibrium studied may sustain an optimal resource allocation, and when it does it sus tains it in a manner that appears to be informationally efficient and to accord well with individual incentives. Therefore it is important to extend the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, under which it sustains opti mality, and under which it survives displacements as well as free bargaining among agents | ||
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| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| edition | 1st ed. 1974 |
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| isbn | 9783642658020 |
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| spelling | Marschak, T. Verfasser aut General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms by T. Marschak, R. Selten 1st ed. 1974 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1974 1 Online-Ressource (XI, 247 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 91 Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding "rationally" to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consistent and feasible. The prices may also be described as "taken": for one reason or another the agents who respond to them consider them as given. The existence of such a state, its optimality, its robustness against free bargaining among agents when there are many of them, its Wliqueness, its stability when price displacements evoke specified adjustments--all these issues have been studied, and continue to be studied in a variety of settings. Slowly the equilibrium investigated begins to incorporate public goods, externalities of certain kinds, differences in agents' information, and infinitely many time periods. The appeal of such results need not be belabored: the equilibrium studied may sustain an optimal resource allocation, and when it does it sus tains it in a manner that appears to be informationally efficient and to accord well with individual incentives. Therefore it is important to extend the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, under which it sustains opti mality, and under which it survives displacements as well as free bargaining among agents Operations Management Production management Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd rswk-swf Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 s DE-604 Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 s Selten, R. aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642658037 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540066248 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Marschak, T. Selten, R. General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms Operations Management Production management Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4066399-1 (DE-588)4117638-8 |
| title | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms |
| title_auth | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms |
| title_exact_search | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms |
| title_full | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms by T. Marschak, R. Selten |
| title_fullStr | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms by T. Marschak, R. Selten |
| title_full_unstemmed | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms by T. Marschak, R. Selten |
| title_short | General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms |
| title_sort | general equilibrium with price making firms |
| topic | Operations Management Production management Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Operations Management Production management Wirtschaft Wettbewerbstheorie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marschakt generalequilibriumwithpricemakingfirms AT seltenr generalequilibriumwithpricemakingfirms |