Choosing for changing selves:
Gespeichert in:
Beteilige Person: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford ; New York, NY
Oxford University Press
2019
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Ausgabe: | First edition |
Schlagwörter: | |
Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032078307&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
Abstract: | What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives, sometimes as a result of decisions we make-such as when we choose to become a parent or move to a new country-and sometimes as a result of forces beyond our control-such as when our political views change as we grow older. This poses a problem for any theory of how we ought to make decisions. Which values and preferences should we appeal to when we are making our decisions? Our current values? Our past ones? Our future ones? Or some amalgamation of all them? But if that, which amalgamation? In Choosing for Changing Selves, Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times |
Umfang: | xiv, 253 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
ISBN: | 9780198814962 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Contents List of Figures Acknowledgements Preface ix xi xiii PARTI. AGGREGATING SELVES 1. The problem of choosing for changing selves 3 2. The economists’ orthodoxy: expected utility theory 2.1 Expected utility theory: an example 2.2 Expected utility theory: the general case 2.3 Interpreting expected utility theory 2.4 Alternative decision theories 2.5 Expected utility theory and the problem of choosing for changing selves 9 9 11 14 15 3. Existing solutions I: the Unchanging Utility Solution 19 4. Existing solutions II: the Utility of Utility Solution 25 5. Existing solutions III: the One True Utility Solution 5.1 The Reflection Principle 5.2 The Weak Reflection Principle 5.3 Permissivism and learning from others 5.4 The objectivist’s version of our problem 5.5 The implausible strength of objectivism 5.6 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.1.1 28 30 34 37 44 46 47 6. The Aggregate Utility Solution I: which attitudes to aggregate? 6.1 Aggregating preferences 6.2 Aggregating evaluation functions 6.3 Aggregating credences and utilities 49 51 59 68 7. The Aggregate Utility Solution II: the solution itself 7.1 The framework 7.2 The decision rule 7.3 The instability of preferences 7.4 Responding to instability 73 73 75 76 84 8. Can we compare the utilities of different selves? 8.1 Representing values with numbers 8.2 Empathetic preferences 8.3 The Zero-One Rule 8.4 The Fixed Points Solution 8.5 The Fixed Interval Solution 8.6 The Matching Intervals Solution 17 87 90 93 94 96 99 102
vi CONTENTS 9. Why aggregate using weighted averages? 104 9.1 The argument for linear pooling 106 9.1.1 The Principle of Minimal Mutilation 107 9.1.2 The dominance argument for weighted averages 109 9.2 The features of linear pooling 115 9.2.1 Arrow’s conditions 116 9.2.2 Aggregating credences I: Independence Preservation 118 9.2.3 Aggregating credences II: commuting with conditionalization 122 9.2.4 Aggregating credences III: Independence Preservation revisited 126 9.3 Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 9.2.1 and 9.2.3 128 9.3.1 Proof of Theorem 9.2.3 129 10. Do we know enough to make decisions this way? 10.1 The deliberative conception of decisiontheory 10.2 Paul’s Utility Ignorance Objection 10.3 Paul’s Revelation Response 10.4 The Fine-Graining Response 10.5 Paul’s Authenticity Reply 10.6 Moss’s No Knowledge Reply 10.7 Assessing Moss’s No Knowledge Reply: thePaulian view 10.8 Assessing Moss’s No Knowledge Reply: theindependent view 131 131 132 135 136 138 140 145 148 PARTII. SETTING THE WEIGHTS 11. The problem of weighting changing selves 157 12. The weight of the past 12.1 Deathbed decisions 12.2 Past values and permissibility 12.3 Past values and obligations 12.3.1 Three related principles 12.3.2 The libertarian objection 12.3.3 Exchange rates 12.3.4 Moral blackmail 12.3.5 Applying the Beneficiary Principle 12.3.6 Obligations and reparations 12.3.7 The intrapersonal version of the Beneficiary Principle 162 163 167 171 172 174 176 178 179 180 182 13. Discounting the future 13.1 The epistemic defence of temporal discounting 13.2 Parfit’s defence of temporal discounting 13.3 A
formal framework for temporal discounting 13.4 Constraints on discounting functions 13.5 Ahmed’s objection to Parfit 13.6 Amending Ahmed’s objection 13.7 Exploitability does not imply irrationality 184 186 186 187 189 192 194 195
CONTENTS 13.7.1 Time Consistency and Unexploitability 13.7.2 Changing preferences and changing selves 13.7.3 Equal weightings 13.7.4 On the alleged badness of exploitability 13.8 Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas 13.4.1,13.4.2, and 13.4.3 Vii 196 197 198 198 203 14. The nearer the dearer 14.1 The Stoic Objection 14.2 Proximity considerations 14.3 Aneri’s career 14.4 Fernando’s pension 14.5 The Problem of Choosing for Changing Weights 208 208 211 213 215 216 15. I’ll be glad I did it—so, I’ll do it 15.1 What is‘I’ll be glad I did it’reasoning? 15.2 Two problems with the reasoning 15.3 Deborah’s choice 15.4 Self-frustrating choices 219 220 222 226 227 16. The road ahead 16.1 The Aggregate Utility Solution summarized 16.2 Questions for future selves 16.2.1 Sensitivity to risk 16.2.2 Imprecise credences and imprecise utilities 229 229 231 231 233 Bibliography Index 239 247 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- |
author_GND | (DE-588)1101486279 |
author_facet | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- |
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author_sort | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- |
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building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV046667272 |
classification_rvk | CC 2500 CC 4500 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1143488137 (DE-599)BVBBV046667272 |
discipline | Philosophie |
edition | First edition |
format | Book |
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illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2025-03-04T09:00:50Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780198814962 |
language | English |
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physical | xiv, 253 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
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publishDateSort | 2019 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
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spelling | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- Verfasser (DE-588)1101486279 aut Choosing for changing selves Richard Pettigrew First edition Oxford ; New York, NY Oxford University Press 2019 xiv, 253 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm txt rdacontent sti rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives, sometimes as a result of decisions we make-such as when we choose to become a parent or move to a new country-and sometimes as a result of forces beyond our control-such as when our political views change as we grow older. This poses a problem for any theory of how we ought to make decisions. Which values and preferences should we appeal to when we are making our decisions? Our current values? Our past ones? Our future ones? Or some amalgamation of all them? But if that, which amalgamation? In Choosing for Changing Selves, Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 gnd rswk-swf Rational Choice (DE-588)4274923-2 gnd rswk-swf Abwägung (DE-588)4141183-3 gnd rswk-swf Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects Ethics Rational choice theory Choice (Psychology) Values Abwägung (DE-588)4141183-3 s Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 s Rational Choice (DE-588)4274923-2 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032078307&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Pettigrew, Richard 1981- Choosing for changing selves Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 gnd Rational Choice (DE-588)4274923-2 gnd Abwägung (DE-588)4141183-3 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4014904-3 (DE-588)4274923-2 (DE-588)4141183-3 |
title | Choosing for changing selves |
title_auth | Choosing for changing selves |
title_exact_search | Choosing for changing selves |
title_full | Choosing for changing selves Richard Pettigrew |
title_fullStr | Choosing for changing selves Richard Pettigrew |
title_full_unstemmed | Choosing for changing selves Richard Pettigrew |
title_short | Choosing for changing selves |
title_sort | choosing for changing selves |
topic | Entscheidung (DE-588)4014904-3 gnd Rational Choice (DE-588)4274923-2 gnd Abwägung (DE-588)4141183-3 gnd |
topic_facet | Entscheidung Rational Choice Abwägung |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032078307&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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