Well-founded belief: new essays on the epistemic basing relation
Gespeichert in:
Weitere beteiligte Personen: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York ; London
Routledge
2019
|
Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in epistemology
4 |
Schlagwörter: | |
Abstract: | "Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"-- |
Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
Umfang: | vi, 330 Seiten |
ISBN: | 9781138503755 1138503754 9781032337333 |
Internformat
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490 | 1 | |a Routledge studies in epistemology |v 4 | |
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520 | 3 | |a "Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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building | Verbundindex |
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classification_rvk | CC 4400 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1142767073 (DE-599)BVBBV046356623 |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Book |
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spelling | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy New York ; London Routledge 2019 vi, 330 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology 4 Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke "Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"-- Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Vernunft (DE-588)4063106-0 gnd rswk-swf Relation (DE-588)4049355-6 gnd rswk-swf Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd rswk-swf Epistemics Evidence Knowledge, Theory of (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Vernunft (DE-588)4063106-0 s Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 s Relation (DE-588)4049355-6 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Carter, J. Adam 1980- (DE-588)1064111130 edt Bondy, Patrick (DE-588)1153565439 edt Online version Well-founded belief New York : Routledge, 2019 9781315145518 Routledge studies in epistemology 4 (DE-604)BV046345287 4 |
spellingShingle | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation Routledge studies in epistemology Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Vernunft (DE-588)4063106-0 gnd Relation (DE-588)4049355-6 gnd Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4063106-0 (DE-588)4049355-6 (DE-588)4071867-0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
title | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
title_auth | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
title_exact_search | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
title_full | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
title_fullStr | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
title_full_unstemmed | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
title_short | Well-founded belief |
title_sort | well founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
title_sub | new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
topic | Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Vernunft (DE-588)4063106-0 gnd Relation (DE-588)4049355-6 gnd Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Erkenntnistheorie Vernunft Relation Glaube Aufsatzsammlung |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV046345287 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT carterjadam wellfoundedbeliefnewessaysontheepistemicbasingrelation AT bondypatrick wellfoundedbeliefnewessaysontheepistemicbasingrelation |