Countering Russian social media influence:
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, California
RAND Corporation
[2018]
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Abstract: | In January 2017, the U.S. intelligence community released a public report detailing a Russian influence campaign, ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin, to disrupt the U.S. presidential election. Part of a larger multifaceted approach, this campaign included social media-based disinformation spread by both automated bots and paid trolls. Russia's strategy was to push several conflicting narratives simultaneously, deepening existing divisions within American society and degrading trust in Western institutions and the democratic process. While it is unknown what impact the campaign might have had on the 2016 presidential election, or on individual opinions, it is clear that Russia's efforts reached many Americans through a variety of social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook. The Russian "disinformation chain" that directs these campaigns starts from the very top-from Russian leadership, to Russian organs and proxies, through amplification channels such as social media platforms, and finally to U.S. media consumers. This report categorizes and analyzes different approaches and policy options to respond to the specific threat of Russian influence via disinformation spread on social media in the United States. It is meant to educate and inform U.S. government officials considering policies for combating Russian disinformation; social media companies undertaking efforts to reduce the spread of disinformation on their platforms; NGOs, think tanks, and academics developing new approaches to address the threat of disinformation; and the American public |
| Beschreibung: | xvii, 66 Seiten |
| Umfang: | 66 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9781977401823 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 505 | 8 | |a Introduction -- Disinformation Chain -- Current Efforts and Proposed Solutions -- Conclusions and Recommendations | |
| 520 | 3 | |a In January 2017, the U.S. intelligence community released a public report detailing a Russian influence campaign, ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin, to disrupt the U.S. presidential election. Part of a larger multifaceted approach, this campaign included social media-based disinformation spread by both automated bots and paid trolls. Russia's strategy was to push several conflicting narratives simultaneously, deepening existing divisions within American society and degrading trust in Western institutions and the democratic process. While it is unknown what impact the campaign might have had on the 2016 presidential election, or on individual opinions, it is clear that Russia's efforts reached many Americans through a variety of social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook. The Russian "disinformation chain" that directs these campaigns starts from the very top-from Russian leadership, to Russian organs and proxies, through amplification channels such as social media platforms, and finally to U.S. media consumers. This report categorizes and analyzes different approaches and policy options to respond to the specific threat of Russian influence via disinformation spread on social media in the United States. It is meant to educate and inform U.S. government officials considering policies for combating Russian disinformation; social media companies undertaking efforts to reduce the spread of disinformation on their platforms; NGOs, think tanks, and academics developing new approaches to address the threat of disinformation; and the American public | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818984981432631296 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth Helmus, Todd C. Radin, Andrew Treyger, Elina |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1163572799 (DE-588)116357239X (DE-588)1139190016 (DE-588)1190908492 |
| author_facet | Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth Helmus, Todd C. Radin, Andrew Treyger, Elina |
| author_role | aut aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth |
| author_variant | e b b ebb t c h tc tch a r ar e t et |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045456145 |
| contents | Introduction -- Disinformation Chain -- Current Efforts and Proposed Solutions -- Conclusions and Recommendations |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1110077821 (DE-599)BVBBV045456145 |
| format | Book |
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| spelling | Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth Verfasser (DE-588)1163572799 aut Countering Russian social media influence Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger Santa Monica, California RAND Corporation [2018] 66 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier xvii, 66 Seiten Introduction -- Disinformation Chain -- Current Efforts and Proposed Solutions -- Conclusions and Recommendations In January 2017, the U.S. intelligence community released a public report detailing a Russian influence campaign, ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin, to disrupt the U.S. presidential election. Part of a larger multifaceted approach, this campaign included social media-based disinformation spread by both automated bots and paid trolls. Russia's strategy was to push several conflicting narratives simultaneously, deepening existing divisions within American society and degrading trust in Western institutions and the democratic process. While it is unknown what impact the campaign might have had on the 2016 presidential election, or on individual opinions, it is clear that Russia's efforts reached many Americans through a variety of social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook. The Russian "disinformation chain" that directs these campaigns starts from the very top-from Russian leadership, to Russian organs and proxies, through amplification channels such as social media platforms, and finally to U.S. media consumers. This report categorizes and analyzes different approaches and policy options to respond to the specific threat of Russian influence via disinformation spread on social media in the United States. It is meant to educate and inform U.S. government officials considering policies for combating Russian disinformation; social media companies undertaking efforts to reduce the spread of disinformation on their platforms; NGOs, think tanks, and academics developing new approaches to address the threat of disinformation; and the American public Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd rswk-swf Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 gnd rswk-swf Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Social media / Political aspects / United States Social media / Political aspects / Russia (Federation) Propaganda, Russian / United States United States / Relations / Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) / Relations / United States International relations Propaganda, Russian Social media / Political aspects Russia (Federation) United States Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 s Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 s DE-604 Helmus, Todd C. Verfasser (DE-588)116357239X aut Radin, Andrew Verfasser (DE-588)1139190016 aut Treyger, Elina Verfasser (DE-588)1190908492 aut |
| spellingShingle | Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth Helmus, Todd C. Radin, Andrew Treyger, Elina Countering Russian social media influence Introduction -- Disinformation Chain -- Current Efforts and Proposed Solutions -- Conclusions and Recommendations Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 gnd Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4112701-8 (DE-588)4639271-3 (DE-588)4252093-9 (DE-588)4076899-5 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Countering Russian social media influence |
| title_auth | Countering Russian social media influence |
| title_exact_search | Countering Russian social media influence |
| title_full | Countering Russian social media influence Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger |
| title_fullStr | Countering Russian social media influence Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger |
| title_full_unstemmed | Countering Russian social media influence Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger |
| title_short | Countering Russian social media influence |
| title_sort | countering russian social media influence |
| topic | Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd Social Media (DE-588)4639271-3 gnd Desinformation (DE-588)4252093-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Bekämpfung Social Media Desinformation Russland USA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bodinebaronelizabeth counteringrussiansocialmediainfluence AT helmustoddc counteringrussiansocialmediainfluence AT radinandrew counteringrussiansocialmediainfluence AT treygerelina counteringrussiansocialmediainfluence |