Knowledge and truth in Plato: stepping past the shadow of Socrates
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2018
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030297740&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030297740&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Umfang: | xviii, 305 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780199693658 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents
Acknowledgements
Part I. Knowledge, Truth, and Belief
1. Knowledge, Conceptual Knowledge, and the Iconic Route
to Grasping an Idea
I. In Which We Consider Whether ‘Knowledge Is an Important Topic
in Plato s Work
Li That there is an irreducible form of knowledge that has to do with
grasping concepts and types or forms; Lii That Lyons s structural
semantics approach to understanding Plato s term episteme needs to be
superseded; I.iii Whether ‘knowledge is a useful translation for Plato s
knowledge words; I.iv That knowledge is not a species of (propositional)
belief and that Plato does not mean ‘belief when he speaks of doxa
IL In Which We Classify Twentieth-Century Interpretations of Plato s
Epistemology Into Roughly Three Distinct Views, and I Place My View
in This Taxonomy (or Outside It)
IIJ That there are two classic ways of understanding the relation between
Plato s Middle and Later dialogues, one Unitarian and one developmental
and a third way that is also Unitarian; ILii Some further options; ILiii That
my interpretation is a variant of the first type; ILiv That the contrast
between episteme and doxa is the contrast between the grasp of types
or concepts and the recognition of tokens or instances
III. In Which We Consider Whether it Is a Good Idea to Look for a Definition,
and, If So, Why
IILi That definition can serve three different roles in philosophical work, only
one of which is part of a philosophical method; IILii That failing to find a
definition can be a fruitful part of a philosophical investigation, when the
authors aim is to problematize faulty assumptions or diagnose confusion;
IILiii That the definition does not need to be in terms understood by the
interlocutor.; nor does Socrates (or Plato) think that it does
IV. In Which We Investigate How Knowing Relates to Factual Information
and Propositional Utterances or Beliefs
TV. i That knowledge should not be equated with the ability to do something
or to express a belief in words, although those abilities may be evidence of
knowing TV.ii That some other kinds of knowing besides knowing particular
facts about states of affairs, are more important for understanding what Plato is
talking about; TV.iii That the ability to read the world as made up of tokens that
instantiate types is like using a map dense with pictorial information
V. In Which I Summarize the Plan for the Rest of This Book
xii CONTENTS
2. Truth and Belief
I. In Which We Consider the Relation Between Knowledge and Truth, and
Between Knowledge and Belief
I. i That knowledge is about something, but not about a proposition, or about
the truth of a proposition; Lii That it is a mistake to suppose (with Vendler
and others) that belief but not knowledge, is a propositional attitude
II. In Which We Consider What Truth Is, and How It Can Be a
Property of Things
II. i That there are several ways of talking of truth in Greek; ILii That we
should understand the veridical sense of the verb to be3 as a reference to the
truth in things, which is a kind of being something; ILiii That truth in
sentences and descriptions is derivative from the primary kind of truth in
things; ILiv That some truth can be found in what Heidegger and Detienne
say about aletheia; II.v That there is something similar in Aristotle; ILvi That
it is time to reclaim the spectator model of knowledge and truth
III. That Truth Can Be Observed by Viewing the Things That Reflect It
HU That all kinds of deliberate representations and naturally occurring
instances can serve as icons, and that Plato s methodology makes use of this
Part II. Plato’s Meno
3. Introduction and Summary for Part II: Plato’s
I. In Which We Note That Plato Is Arguing on the Same Side as Wittgenstein,
Against Socratic Essential ism
II. That the Geometry Episode Proves That One Can Identify a Precise but
Indefinable Length by Pointing, Not Saying
III. That Socrates Turns to the Hypothetical Method Not as a Second Best, but as
the Perfect Method for Dealing with Types That Have No Essential Definition
IV. That Knowing ‘What It Is’ About Some Type F Does Not Equate to Knowing
Which Tokens Fall Under the Type, or to a Description of the Shared
Properties of F Things, or to Any Classification of the F as a Token of a
More Generic Type
I Vi That the dichotomy between knowing an object and knowing a proposition
is a false one, and that Socrates means neither of those things when he speaks
of knowing virtue what it is ; IV. ii That the example of knowing Meno, who
he is is about a type, not a token, exactly like the case of virtue
V. That the Distinction Between Episteme and Doxa in Plato Is the Distinction
Between the Intellectual Grasp of the Type and the Experiential Recognition
of Particular Tokens, Whether With the Senses or Just in the Mind
4. Knowing What Virtue Is in Plato’s Meno
I. In Which We Consider How We Should Read the Meno
Li That we must distinguish between Plato and his characters, including the
Socrates character; Lii A review of the key turning points in the dialogue,
which show that Socrates caused the confusion by insisting on the priority
of definition; Liii That Plato s chosen illustration, the search for the
34
34
40
49
55
55
56
58
59
65
69
69
CONTENTS Xiii
indefinable side of the double square, is intended to prove that what
someone knows may not be definable (by anyone, in principle, not just in
practice); Liv That Socrates still wants to know ‘what virtue is’ before asking
other questionSy but knowing cwhat it is’ no longer means giving a definition
II. In Which We Note That the Hypothetical Method (If Well Done) Is Ideal
for Poion Esti Questions About Vague Concepts With No Neat Definitions 76
II. i The failure of the hypothetical method: that Socrates is to blame;
II. ii A better attempt at explaining how we become competent with the
virtue concept without any need to define it
III. In Which We Conclude That Not Being Able to Say ‘What It Is’ Concerning
Some Concept Is Perfectly Compatible With Knowing ‘What It Is’ 82
5. Knowledge and Correct Impressions in Plato’s Meno 84
L Orientation: Issues About the Relation Between Doxa and Episteme
Arising From Chapter 4 84
II. Concerning Passage A: The Opening Pages of the Meno (70a-71e) 85
ILi That there is no one left in Athens who can answer Meno’s question
‘because Gorgias has gone to Larissa; ILii That Socrates cannot answer
Meno’s question ‘because he does not know the answer*
III. Passage C: How Knowledge Differs From a Merely Correct Impression 87
I ILi Passage C, stage 1: it is possible to answer a question from a position
that is not knowledge; III. ii Passage Q stage 2: the road to Larissa;
III. Hi Passage C, stage 3: knowledge about and knowledge of;
IILiv Passage C, stage 4: the advantage of knowledge over true seeming;
III. v Passage C, stage 5: the statues ofDaedalusy and explanatory
reasoning; IILvi Passage C, stage 6: a difficulty—do seemings become knowings?
IV. Passage B: Lessons From the Slave-Boy Passage 99
IV. i That ‘the boy did not already know’, meaning The boy did not have
the knowledge already available’; and that Socrates does not teach him
anything that he did not know; IV.ii Passage B continues: the boy did
have knowledge; IV.iii Locating the back reference in Passage C
V. Once Again, Can True Doxa Turn Into Knowledge? 103
VI. Conclusion: That Neither Doxa Nor Episteme Is a Propositional Attitude 106
Part III. Plato’s Republic
6. Introduction and Summary for Part III: Plato’s Republic 111
I. In Which We Consider the Plan of the Republic, and Why the Quest
for a Definition Is Abandoned 111
II. That We Can Avoid Ascribing Fallacies to Plato Once We Understand
Plato’s Method 112
7. Discovering What Justice Is in Plato’s Republic 115
I. In Which We Examine the Argument of the Republic and Discover That
Plato Is Not Trying to Define Justice but Is Using a Method That Bypasses
the Need for Definition 115
XIV CONTENTS
II. In Which We Examine the Text More Closely, to Reconstruct the Hunt
for the City s Justice in Republic 4, and We Discover No Definition 118
ILi That the hunting in Passage A is a hunt for the city s justice not for
justice as such; II. ii That the method and the finding are comparable to
finding the line on the diagram in the Meno, and to the things admired by
the lovers of sights and sounds; ILiii That this ought to be a bad answer to
the (what is justice? question, by Socrates own previous standards;
ILiv Ontological interlude: Forms and tropes
III. In Which We Consider How Socrates Is Able to Move Forward From
Identifying the Justice of a Particular City, to Grasping What Justice Is 123
IIIJ That Socrates uses the analogy of rubbing sticks together to explain
his method; HIM That there are other passages that explain the method;
IILiii That the ambitions of the method are not to define justice
IV. In Which We Consider David Sachs’s Objection, That There Is a Fallacy of
Equating ‘Platonic Justice’ With ‘Vulgar Justice’ 128
IV. i That the shift to the inner disposition is already explained in Adeimantus s
challenge in Book 2; IV.ii Three ways to read the passage about temple-raiding in
Republic 4, of which the third is neither fallacious nor reductionist
V. In Which We Consider the Accusation From Bernard Williams That the
Analogy Between Soul and State Will Not Support Socrates’ Desired
Conclusions 134
V. i That Williams is assuming (a) that the soul/state comparison is an
analogy and (b) that Plato is pursuing an essentialist agenda; V.ii That
Williams constructs a story of crisis, and attempted, but ineffective, solution,
which is of his own making; V.iii That a better interpretation is possible,
if we avoid attributing any essentialist or reductionist moves to Plato
VI. Conclusion 140
8. Platonic Method: The Philosopher’s Route to Knowledge
in Plato’s Republic 142
I. In Which We Juxtapose Socrates’ Comments About Short Versus Long
Routes and About Outlines Versus Finished Drawings, to See Why
Socrates Is Employing a Method That Is Not the Best 142
Li That Socrates identifies, and follows, a shortcut method of enquiry
that is not good enough for the Guardians, but is enough for now;
Lii That Socrates never embarks upon the longer way; Liii That Socrates
takes a route that is third best, in the Sun analogy; I.iv That the Republic
aims at no more detail than is required for the target question, and
that this is what is meant by contrasting outlines with finished works
II. In Which We Consider the Implications of 505a-506d, Where Socrates
Rejects Two Candidate Definitions of the Good, Indicating a General
Problem for the Definitional Project 148
III. In Which We Consider the Role of Icons in the Divided Line 150
IILi That the Line is set up to explain why shadows are epistemically
valuable, and informative, for philosophical enquiry; IILii That the same
CONTENTS XV
relation, of icon to original, characterizes the higher levels of the Divided
Line, and this explains how the method in the Republic is supposed to work;
III. Hi That we can solve some puzzles about the ratios on the Divided Line»
once we see that the degree of clarity is measured by how direct is the access
to truth provided by that kind of investigation; IILiv That there is a missing
section at the bottom of the Divided Line
IV. In Which We Consider What Is Meant by the Talk of ‘Hypotheses’ in the
Divided Line 156
IV. i That the hypotheses (or posits’) are entities not axioms; IV.ii What it
means to treat the posits as sources; at Level 3 of the Line; IV.iii What
happens at Level 4 of the Line, when we no longer appeal to posits as sources;
IV.iv That even at Level 4» the dialectician may use an iconic method;
IV. v That the content of knowledge at all levels of the Line is perceptual
or quasi-visual and conceptual, and never propositional
V. In Which We Consider Whether Socrates Still Thinks That a Person
Who Knows Must Be Able to Give a Logos of What She Knows 163
V. i That the effect of knowledge is to make a person capable of giving
an explanation, even if the knowledge does not consist of propositions
or definitions; V.ii A counter-argument and my response
VI. Conclusion: That the Ideal City Serves Not to Provide a Definition but as
an Icon of Justice, From Which We Can Ascend to a Grasp of Justice Itself 166
Part IV. Plato’s Theaetetus
9. Introduction and Summary for Part IV: Platos Theaetetus 169
I. On the Post-Natal Role of Socrates as Midwife, and the Exposure of
Theaetetus s First Brainchild 171
Li That the midwife has a twofold role; I.ii That Theaetetus s first
brainchild is consigned to the discard pile, once its auxiliary theories
have been found too extreme to survive; Liii That Theaetetus*$ second
proposal, that science is true discernment, is also supported with elaborate
survival aids and then rejected as non-viable by the midwife; I.iv That
the third brainchild also proves too sick to save
II. On the Search for a Science of Ousia 175
II. i That the Interlude redefines aisthesis as a technical term for sensory
perception, as distinct from doxa; II.ii That Socrates and Theaetetus are
mistakenly looking among the cognitive contents of doxa. for what they
need, namely a grasp of ousia,* Il.iii That Theaetetus is too young and
inexperienced in dialectic to understand why his second thesis has failed;
II. iv That perception and doxa, whether true or false, presuppose another
kind of knowledge, namely knowing (what it is7 about the type
10. Geometry and the Scientific Project: Theaetetus 142a-184b 181
I. In Which We Discover the Significance of Theaetetus s Aptitude for
Geometry and of His Premature Death
181
xvi CONTENTS
Li That the search for a definition oft písteme must fail, and this is partly
because Theaetetus is too young
II. In Which We Consider Whether Listing Examples Could Be a Good
Answer, and Discover Why Socrates Analysis of Clay Is an Unhelpful Model 185
ILi That mentioning examples is part of the iconic method, and that Socrates
objections to the examples, and his recommended kind of analysis, are not
the usual ones, but are nonetheless misguided; ILU That Theaetetuss three
definitions ofepisteme are all designed to follow the model of a simple
compositional analysis, which is a faulty model and leads to failure;
II.in That there is nothing wrong with using the term that is to be defined,
and that Socrates is confused on that score
III. In Which We Briefly Consider Theaetetus s Proposal That Science Is
‘Perception: Whether It Is a Good Suggestion and Why It Fails to Thrive 192
I I I.i That Theaetetus conceives his proposed definitions by the iconic method,
generalizing from his experience of geometry as a science, and that his first
proposal has some merits, since knowledge of concepts is a bit like perception;
HIM That Socrates respects the standard constraints on what can count as
science, in developing his support package for EA
IV. Conclusion: That Geometry Invites the Thought That We Perceive
the Intelligible Types in the Diagram, and That No Other Scientific
Knowledge Is Presupposed 195
11. The Division Between Sense Perception and Non-Sensory Doxa in the
Interlude: Theaetetus 184a-187b 197
I. In Which We Clarify the Meaning of Doxa and Doxazein in the Rest
of the Dialogue 197
I.i That believe or judge are not good translations for D, and why not;
I.H That when Socrates lists being as (hypothetically) one of the features
accessible to D but not SP, he does not mean propositional form
II. In Which We Take Issue With Some Classic Interpretations of the
Interlude and Their More Recent Descendants 201
ILi That there are four ways of reading the reference to being*, and that
the most popular reading takes it as marking a feature of propositions;
ILii That many interpretations cobble together Reading C and Reading P,
sometimes with other interpretations as well in trying to make sense
of Plato s text
III. In Which We Embark on a Reading of the Interlude and Note That Socrates
Distinguishes Two Faculties Equipped to Detect Non-Propositional
Features, One With, and One Without, the Use of Bodily Organs 208
IILi That Socrates explains his distinction between SP and D by giving
lists of paradigm cases; IILii That the argument does not assume that all
sensibles are special sensibles, accessible to only one sense; IH.iii Whether
we see with our eyes or with our souls, and why stipulating some technical
terminology helps the argument here (but has nothing to do with correcting
CONTENTS XVii
an earlier mistake or inventing a unified consciousness); IILiv That the
thought experiment at 185b is not a mistake, but reinforces the key premise,
to ensure it is understood; III.v That the ‘being’ in List B is not the copula,
and that propositional form characterizes enquiry (both sensory and
dianoetic), but not its conclusions; III. vi That nothing much hangs on
the claim that some features in List A or B are ‘commonIILvii That
when Socrates links being with truth, this is not because they are
propositional; IILviii That we should respect the fact that the text lists
‘being’ as one of several doxastic features
IV. In Which I Canvass a Solution to the Puzzle, by Suggesting That Socrates
and Theaetetus are Right That Science Must Access the Truth, But Are
Mistaken About What Truth Is, About Its Relation to Being, and
That Doxa Captures the Relevant Kind of Truth 220
IV. i That situating the Interlude alongside the Phaedo and the ‘digression
in the Theaetetus is informative; IV.ii That the Interlude seems to confuse
the discovery of certain List B features with discovering the ‘ti esti5;
IViii That an alternative possibility whereby the Interlude draws the
same distinction as the Phaedo, seems less convincing on balance;
IV.iv That doxa can indeed discern instances of being, in some sense
of‘being’, but not in the sense relevant for episteme; IV. v That Plato
has not changed his model of episteme, which is still the science that
grasps *what it is’ about a type
V. Conclusion: That Doxa Will Not Be a Good Place to Look For Episteme,
Given What Episteme Is About 230
12. On the Failure of the Remaining Two Attempts to Analyse Episteme:
Theaetetus 187b-210a 231
I. In Which We Consider What ‘True’ Means, When Theaetetus
Says That ‘There Is Also False Doxa’, and Conclude That He Is
Noting the Difference Between Correct and Incorrect Answers to
‘What Is It?’ Questions 231
Li That Theaetetus, being misled by the irrelevant contrast sketched in
the Interlude, tries to analyse science as a subset of doxa; I.ii That there
are two notions of truth at work in the dialogue; Liii That when Theaetetus
contrasts true and false doxa he must mean ‘true’ in the folk sense
II. In Which We Consider the Falsity Problems That Socrates Raises, and
How They Contribute to the Discussion 235
II.i That ETDfaib because it cannot distinguish knowledge of types from
discernment of tokens, which is parasitic on the former; ILii That the ETD
brainchild cannot survive, because it undermines itself; for if it were correct,
neither truth nor falsity would be possible, even in discerning the identity
of singular tokens; ILiii That Plato is not confused and is not struggling;
ILiv That false doxa of the relevant kind is not due to ‘ignorance birds’,
but uses the same conceptual tools as true judgements on the same matters
xviii CONTENTS
III. In Which We Examine Why Socrates Concludes the Examination of
ETD With the Jury Example 241
III A That the jury example is vague, intuitive, and offers no theoretical
explanation of the reason why; IILii That we should remember how, in
the Digression, Socrates spoke about the lack of time for the lawyers to do
their job properly in the law courts
IV. In Which We Consider the TDL Analysis, and Socrates’ Attempts to
Devise a Rescue Package for It 248
IVA That the Dream theory tries to explain what puts an object out of
reach of science, on the mistaken assumption that science consists in the
analysis of composites into their components; IVAi That Socrates provides
support by seeking potentially helpful meanings of logos, and that the
first two kinds of logos—though inadequate for the task—are not so
simple-minded as they seem; IVAii That the third suggestion is also
somewhat trickier to understand than it seems, and that Plato is not
secretly recommending it; IVAv That the survey of meanings of logos is
probably not noticeably incomplete; IV. v That regardless of whether the
discussion has been exhaustive, TDL still fails
V. Conclusion: That Plato Is Not in the Same Position as Socrates,
Since He Never Approved of the Naturalistic Project That Socrates
Pursues in This Dialogue 257
Part V. The Bigger Picture
13. Conclusions and Further Tasks 261
I. Where Are We Now? 261
Li A retrospective on certain unexpected results of this enquiry;
I. ii That we need a special sense of is7 for knowing ‘what it is7 in the
ti esti sense; Liii That the key to reading Plato can sometimes lie in the
dramatic setting; I.iv That Plato is right about the logical distinction
between semantic tools and extensional objects; I.v That Plato is right
about the special kind of knowing involved in grasping or possessing concepts;
I.vi That Plato is right that searching for definitions is vacuous, and
that there are better ways to make philosophical progress, by using images
and icons; I.vii That Plato is not an opponent of images or illustrations;
Lviii That Plato is on sound ground speaking of the truth in representations
as derivative from a prior truth in the things
II. Where Do We Go From Here? 271
IIA About Platos Cratylus; IIAi About Platos Sophist; IIAii Conclusion:
that conceptual knowledge is irreducible and primitive
Bibliography 277
Index 287
Index Locorum 301
Several myths about Plato’s work are decisively challenged by Catherine
Rowett* the idea that Plato agreed with Socrates about the need for a
definition of what we know; the idea that he set out to define justice
in the Republic; the idea that knowledge is a kind of true belief, or that
Plato ever thought that it might be something like that; the idea that
‘knowledge proper’ is propositional, and that the Theaetetus was Plato’s
best attempt to define knowledge as a species of belief, and that it only
failed due to his incompetence.
Instead Rowett argues that Plato was replacing the failed methods of
Socrates, including his attempt to find a definition or single common
factor, and that he replaced those methods with methods derived from
geometry, including methods that involve inference from shadows to their
originals (a method which Rowett calls ‘the iconic method’). As a result
we should see that Plato is presenting the knowledge that is acquired as
non-propositional and pictorial in nature, and that it is to be identified not
with knowledge of facts or of objects, but of types qua types—types that
stand to the tokens that are used in our enquiry as original to shadow. The
book includes detailed studies of the Republic, and Theaetetus, and
argues that the insights that Plato brings about the nature of conceptual
knowledge, its importance in underpinning all other activities, and the
notion of truth as it applies to conceptual competence are significant and
should be taken seriously as a corrective to areas in which current analytic
philosophy has lost its way.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Rowett, Catherine 1956- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)142220116 |
| author_facet | Rowett, Catherine 1956- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Rowett, Catherine 1956- |
| author_variant | c r cr |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV044904023 |
| classification_rvk | CD 3067 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1036359610 (DE-599)BVBBV044904023 |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV044904023 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T18:13:49Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199693658 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030297740 |
| oclc_num | 1036359610 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-20 DE-12 DE-384 DE-M468 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-20 DE-12 DE-384 DE-M468 |
| physical | xviii, 305 Seiten |
| psigel | gbd_JL_Z1805 |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publishDateSearch | 2018 |
| publishDateSort | 2018 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Rowett, Catherine 1956- Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates Plato v427-v347 (DE-588)118594893 gnd Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118594893 (DE-588)4064314-1 (DE-588)4066559-8 |
| title | Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates |
| title_auth | Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates |
| title_exact_search | Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates |
| title_full | Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates Catherine Rowett |
| title_fullStr | Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates Catherine Rowett |
| title_full_unstemmed | Knowledge and truth in Plato stepping past the shadow of Socrates Catherine Rowett |
| title_short | Knowledge and truth in Plato |
| title_sort | knowledge and truth in plato stepping past the shadow of socrates |
| title_sub | stepping past the shadow of Socrates |
| topic | Plato v427-v347 (DE-588)118594893 gnd Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Plato v427-v347 Wahrheit Wissen |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030297740&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030297740&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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