Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations
This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentiv...
Gespeichert in:
Beteiligte Personen: | , |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
Florence
Taylor and Francis
2013
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Schriftenreihe: | Routledge Global Security Studies
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Schlagwörter: | |
Links: | https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136225826 https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136225826 |
Zusammenfassung: | This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target's Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general |
Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 281 Seiten) |
ISBN: | 9780203098172 |
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520 | |a This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target's Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general | ||
650 | 4 | |a Economic sanctions | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. 1962- Ripsman, Norrin M. |
author_GND | (DE-588)1062799038 (DE-588)1120127785 |
author_facet | Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. 1962- Ripsman, Norrin M. |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. 1962- |
author_variant | j m f b jmf jmfb n m r nm nmr |
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bvnumber | BV044597375 |
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dewey-full | 327.117 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
dewey-raw | 327.117 |
dewey-search | 327.117 |
dewey-sort | 3327.117 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | DE-604.BV044597375 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-20T18:06:42Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780203098172 |
language | English |
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physical | 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 281 Seiten) |
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publisher | Taylor and Francis |
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spelling | Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. 1962- (DE-588)1062799038 aut Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations Florence Taylor and Francis 2013 © 2013 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 281 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Routledge Global Security Studies Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target's Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general Economic sanctions International economic relations National security Ripsman, Norrin M. (DE-588)1120127785 aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy : Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations Florence : Taylor and Francis,c2013 9780415629935 https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136225826 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. 1962- Ripsman, Norrin M. Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations Economic sanctions International economic relations National security |
title | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
title_auth | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
title_exact_search | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
title_full | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
title_fullStr | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
title_full_unstemmed | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
title_short | Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy |
title_sort | economic statecraft and foreign policy sanctions incentives and target state calculations |
title_sub | Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations |
topic | Economic sanctions International economic relations National security |
topic_facet | Economic sanctions International economic relations National security |
url | https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136225826 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT blanchardjeanmarcf economicstatecraftandforeignpolicysanctionsincentivesandtargetstatecalculations AT ripsmannorrinm economicstatecraftandforeignpolicysanctionsincentivesandtargetstatecalculations |