Material beings:

03 According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphys...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person: Van Inwagen, Peter 1942- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Ithaca ; London Cornell University Press 1995
Ausgabe:Cornell paperbacks
Schlagwörter:
Links:https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033
Zusammenfassung:03 According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (viii, 299 Seiten)
ISBN:9781501713033
DOI:10.7591/9781501713033