Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation:
Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; vo...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Outlooks
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Umfang: | 1 online resource (xi, 176 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511614316 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511614316 |
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| 520 | |a Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system | ||
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| indexdate | 2024-12-20T17:49:15Z |
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| isbn | 9780511614316 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Taylor, Alan D. 1947- Verfasser (DE-588)114332959 aut Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation Alan D. Taylor Social Choice & the Mathematics of Manipulation Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2005 1 online resource (xi, 176 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Outlooks Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Voting / Mathematical models Social choice / Mathematical models Political science / Mathematical models Game theory Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s 1\p DE-604 Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s 2\p DE-604 Mathematical Association of America (DE-588)41071-8 isb Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-00883-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-81052-4 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Taylor, Alan D. 1947- Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Voting / Mathematical models Social choice / Mathematical models Political science / Mathematical models Game theory Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4064286-0 (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4114528-8 |
| title | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation |
| title_alt | Social Choice & the Mathematics of Manipulation |
| title_auth | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation |
| title_exact_search | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation |
| title_full | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation Alan D. Taylor |
| title_fullStr | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation Alan D. Taylor |
| title_full_unstemmed | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation Alan D. Taylor |
| title_short | Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation |
| title_sort | social choice and the mathematics of manipulation |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Voting / Mathematical models Social choice / Mathematical models Political science / Mathematical models Game theory Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Politische Wissenschaft Voting / Mathematical models Social choice / Mathematical models Political science / Mathematical models Game theory Wahl Kollektiventscheidung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614316 |
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