Democratic rulemaking:
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected represe...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, MA
National Bureau of Economic Research
November 2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER Working Paper Series
21765 |
| Links: | http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765 |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research |
| Umfang: | 34 Seiten |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043354201 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20160523 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 160210s2015 xx |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043354201 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-M382 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Figueiredo, John M. de |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Democratic rulemaking |c John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, MA |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c November 2015 | |
| 300 | |a 34 Seiten | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a NBER Working Paper Series |v 21765 | |
| 520 | |a This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Stiglitz, Edward H. |d 1980- |0 (DE-588)104379106X |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |o 10.3386/w21765 |
| 830 | 0 | |a NBER Working Paper Series |v 21765 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 21765 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765 |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ebook | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028773611 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818981628687417344 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Figueiredo, John M. de Stiglitz, Edward H. 1980- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)104379106X |
| author_facet | Figueiredo, John M. de Stiglitz, Edward H. 1980- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Figueiredo, John M. de |
| author_variant | j m d f jmd jmdf e h s eh ehs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043354201 |
| collection | ebook |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV043354201 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01466nam a2200313 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043354201</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20160523 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160210s2015 xx |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043354201</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Figueiredo, John M. de</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Democratic rulemaking</subfield><subfield code="c">John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, MA</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">November 2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">34 Seiten</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">NBER Working Paper Series</subfield><subfield code="v">21765</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stiglitz, Edward H.</subfield><subfield code="d">1980-</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)104379106X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="o">10.3386/w21765</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">NBER Working Paper Series</subfield><subfield code="v">21765</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">21765</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebook</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028773611</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043354201 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T17:34:21Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028773611 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 |
| physical | 34 Seiten |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
| publishDateSort | 2015 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | NBER Working Paper Series |
| series2 | NBER Working Paper Series |
| spelling | Figueiredo, John M. de aut Democratic rulemaking John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research November 2015 34 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER Working Paper Series 21765 This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research Stiglitz, Edward H. 1980- (DE-588)104379106X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 10.3386/w21765 NBER Working Paper Series 21765 (DE-604)BV002801238 21765 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Figueiredo, John M. de Stiglitz, Edward H. 1980- Democratic rulemaking NBER Working Paper Series |
| title | Democratic rulemaking |
| title_auth | Democratic rulemaking |
| title_exact_search | Democratic rulemaking |
| title_full | Democratic rulemaking John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz |
| title_fullStr | Democratic rulemaking John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Democratic rulemaking John M. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz |
| title_short | Democratic rulemaking |
| title_sort | democratic rulemaking |
| url | http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT figueiredojohnmde democraticrulemaking AT stiglitzedwardh democraticrulemaking |