The future's back: nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Montreal
McGill-Queen's University Press
c1997
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=404216 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=404216 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=404216 |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references (p. [171]-188) and index 1. Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions -- 2. Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing -- 3. New Directions for Aggregate Testing -- 4. Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88 -- 5. U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence -- 6. Nuclear Stability after the Cold War -- 7. Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"--Based data set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 192 p.) |
| ISBN: | 0773516050 0773516069 0773566562 9780773516052 9780773516069 9780773566569 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The future's back |b nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |c Frank P. Harvey |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818981298735153152 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Harvey, Frank P. |
| author_facet | Harvey, Frank P. |
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| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-search | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.1 3747 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| era | Since 1989 fast |
| era_facet | Since 1989 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043130836 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T17:29:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0773516050 0773516069 0773566562 9780773516052 9780773516069 9780773566569 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028555027 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 192 p.) |
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| publisher | McGill-Queen's University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Harvey, Frank P. Verfasser aut The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey Montreal McGill-Queen's University Press c1997 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 192 p.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (p. [171]-188) and index 1. Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions -- 2. Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing -- 3. New Directions for Aggregate Testing -- 4. Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88 -- 5. U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence -- 6. Nuclear Stability after the Cold War -- 7. Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"--Based data set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry Since 1989 fast Stabilité nucléaire Guerre nucléaire / Prévention Dissuasion (Stratégie) Sécurité internationale POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control bisacsh Ost-West-Konflikt swd Beendigung swd Kernwaffe swd Machtpolitik swd Abschreckung swd Militärpolitik swd Militärisches Gleichgewicht swd HISTORY / Modern / 20th Century bisacsh Deterrence (Strategy) fast Nuclear warfare fast World politics fast Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 gnd rswk-swf Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd rswk-swf Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 gnd rswk-swf Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd rswk-swf Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd rswk-swf Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 s Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 s Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 s Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 s 1\p DE-604 Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 s 2\p DE-604 Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 s 3\p DE-604 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=404216 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Harvey, Frank P. The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Stabilité nucléaire Guerre nucléaire / Prévention Dissuasion (Stratégie) Sécurité internationale POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control bisacsh Ost-West-Konflikt swd Beendigung swd Kernwaffe swd Machtpolitik swd Abschreckung swd Militärpolitik swd Militärisches Gleichgewicht swd HISTORY / Modern / 20th Century bisacsh Deterrence (Strategy) fast Nuclear warfare fast World politics fast Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 gnd Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 gnd Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4074812-1 (DE-588)4003434-3 (DE-588)4130238-2 (DE-588)4075770-5 (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)4065004-2 (DE-588)4168427-8 |
| title | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| title_auth | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| title_exact_search | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| title_full | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey |
| title_fullStr | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey |
| title_full_unstemmed | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey |
| title_short | The future's back |
| title_sort | the future s back nuclear rivalry deterrence theory and crisis stability after the cold war |
| title_sub | nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| topic | Stabilité nucléaire Guerre nucléaire / Prévention Dissuasion (Stratégie) Sécurité internationale POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control bisacsh Ost-West-Konflikt swd Beendigung swd Kernwaffe swd Machtpolitik swd Abschreckung swd Militärpolitik swd Militärisches Gleichgewicht swd HISTORY / Modern / 20th Century bisacsh Deterrence (Strategy) fast Nuclear warfare fast World politics fast Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 gnd Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 gnd Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Stabilité nucléaire Guerre nucléaire / Prévention Dissuasion (Stratégie) Sécurité internationale POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control Ost-West-Konflikt Beendigung Kernwaffe Machtpolitik Abschreckung Militärpolitik Militärisches Gleichgewicht HISTORY / Modern / 20th Century Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics World politics 1989- |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=404216 |
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