The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a "dark side", that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predi...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin
WZB
2013
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| Series: | Discussion paper
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| Links: | http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-209.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86141 |
| Summary: | We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a "dark side", that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters. |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (58 S.) graph. Darst. |
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| spelling | Morton, Rebecca B. 1954- Verfasser (DE-588)131981536 aut The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting Rebecca B. Morton ; Marco Piovesan ; Jean-Robert Tyran Berlin WZB 2013 1 Online-Ressource (58 S.) graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a "dark side", that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters. Piovesan, Marco Verfasser aut Tyran, Jean-Robert 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)120946998 aut http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-209.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86141 Langzeitarchivierung |
| spellingShingle | Morton, Rebecca B. 1954- Piovesan, Marco Tyran, Jean-Robert 1967- The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting |
| title | The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting |
| title_auth | The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting |
| title_exact_search | The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting |
| title_full | The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting Rebecca B. Morton ; Marco Piovesan ; Jean-Robert Tyran |
| title_fullStr | The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting Rebecca B. Morton ; Marco Piovesan ; Jean-Robert Tyran |
| title_full_unstemmed | The dark side of the vote biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting Rebecca B. Morton ; Marco Piovesan ; Jean-Robert Tyran |
| title_short | The dark side of the vote |
| title_sort | the dark side of the vote biased voters social information and information aggregation through majority voting |
| title_sub | biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting |
| url | http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/ii13-209.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86141 |
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