Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection:
Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
CESifo
2014
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper
4638 : Category 4, Labour markets |
| Links: | http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/search/result.html?main.query=4638 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers' indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S.33-36 |
| Umfang: | 36 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 520 | 8 | |a Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers' indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kosfeld, Michael |d 1969- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130444472 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Siemens, Ferdinand von 1973- Kosfeld, Michael 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)12957807X (DE-588)130444472 |
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| author_sort | Siemens, Ferdinand von 1973- |
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| bvnumber | BV041946737 |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)890081270 (DE-599)GBV788934198 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV041946737 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T16:58:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027389798 |
| oclc_num | 890081270 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 36 S. graph. Darst. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateSearch | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | CESifo |
| record_format | marc |
| series | CESifo working paper |
| series2 | CESifo working paper |
| spelling | Siemens, Ferdinand von 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)12957807X aut Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection Ferdinand A. von Siemens ; Michael Kosfeld Munich CESifo 2014 36 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working paper 4638 : Category 4, Labour markets Literaturverz. S.33-36 Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers' indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence Kosfeld, Michael 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)130444472 aut CESifo working paper 4638 : Category 4, Labour markets (DE-604)BV013978326 4638 http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/search/result.html?main.query=4638 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Siemens, Ferdinand von 1973- Kosfeld, Michael 1969- Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection CESifo working paper |
| title | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection |
| title_auth | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection |
| title_exact_search | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection |
| title_full | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection Ferdinand A. von Siemens ; Michael Kosfeld |
| title_fullStr | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection Ferdinand A. von Siemens ; Michael Kosfeld |
| title_full_unstemmed | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection Ferdinand A. von Siemens ; Michael Kosfeld |
| title_short | Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection |
| title_sort | team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection |
| url | http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/search/result.html?main.query=4638 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT siemensferdinandvon teamproductionincompetitivelabormarketswithadverseselection AT kosfeldmichael teamproductionincompetitivelabormarketswithadverseselection |