Game theory: an introduction
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton and Oxford
Princeton University Press
2013
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025687798&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025687798&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Beschreibung: | Diagramme, Illustrationen |
| Umfang: | xvii, 396 Seiten graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780691129082 |
Internformat
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| adam_text | Contents
Preface
PART I Rational Decision Making
Xl
Chapter
1
The Single-Person Decision Problem
3
1.1
Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences
4
1.1.1
Preference Relations
5
1.1.2
Payoff Functions
7
1.2
The Rational Choice Paradigm
9
1.3
Summary
11
1.4
Exercises
11
Chapter
2
Introducing Uncertainty and Time
14
2.1
Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes
14
2.1.1
Finite Outcomes and Simple Lotteries
15
2.1.2
Simple versus Compound Lotteries
16
2.1.3
Lotteries over Continuous Outcomes
17
2.2
Evaluating Random Outcomes
18
2.2.1
Expected Payoff: The Finite Case
19
2.2.2
Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case
20
2.2.3
Caveat: It s Not Just the Order Anymore
21
2.2.4
Risk Attitudes
22
2.2.5
The St. Petersburg Paradox
23
2.3
Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty
24
2.3.1
Rationality Revisited
24
2.3.2
Maximizing Expected Payoffs
24
2.4
Decisions over Time
26
2.4.1
Backward Induction
26
2.4.2
Discounting Future Payoffs
28
2.5
Applications
29
2.5.1
The Value of Information
29
2.5.2
Discounted Future Consumption
31
2.6
Theory versus Practice
32
2.7
Summary
33
2.8
Exercises
33
vi
· Contents
PART II Static Games of Complete Information
Chapter
3
Preliminaries
43
3.1
Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies
46
3.1.1
Example: The Prisoner s Dilemma
48
3.1.2
Example
:
Cournot Duopoly
49
3.1.3
Example: Voting on a New Agenda
49
3.2
Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game
50
3.2.1
Example: The Prisoner s Dilemma
51
3.2.2
Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
52
3.3
Solution Concepts
52
3.3.1
Assumptions and Setup
54
3.3.2
Evaluating Solution Concepts
55
3.3.3
Evaluating Outcomes
56
3.4
Summary
57
3.5
Exercises
58
Chapter
4
Rationality and Common Knowledge
59
4.1
Dominance in Pure Strategies
59
4.1.1
Dominated Strategies
59
4.1.2
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
61
4.1.3
Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
62
4.2
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies
63
4.2.1
Iterated Elimination and Common Knowledge of Rationality
63
4.2.2
Example: Cournot Duopoly
65
4.2.3
Evaluating IESDS
67
4.3
Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability
69
4.3.1
The Best Response
69
4.3.2
Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences
71
4.3.3
Rationalizability
73
4.3.4
The Cournot Duopoly Revisited
73
4.3.5
The p-Beauty Contest
74
4.3.6
Evaluating Rationalizability
76
4.4
Summary
76
4.5
Exercises
76
Chapter
5
Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium
79
5.1
Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
80
5.1.1
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Matrix
81
5.1.2
Evaluating the Nash Equilibria Solution
83
5.2
Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications
83
5.2.1
Two Kinds of Societies
83
5.2.2
The Tragedy of the Commons
84
5.2.3
Cournot Duopoly
87
5.2.4
Bertrand
Duopoly
88
5.2.5
Political Ideology and Electoral Competition
93
5.3
Summary
95
5.4
Exercises
95
Contents ·
vii
Chapter
6
Mixed Strategies
101
6.1
Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs
102
6.1.1
Finite Strategy Sets
102
6.1.2
Continuous Strategy Sets
104
6.1.3
Beliefs and Mixed Strategies
105
6.1.4
Expected Payoffs
105
6.2
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
107
6.2.1
Example: Matching Pennies
108
6.2.2
Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors 111
6.2.3
Multiple Equilibria: Pure and Mixed
113
6.3
1ESDS and Rationalizability Revisited
114
6.4
Nash s Existence Theorem
117
6.5
Summary
123
6.6
Exercises
123
PART III Dynamic Games of Complete Information
Chapter? Preliminaries
129
7.1
The Extensive-Form Game
130
7.1.1
Game Trees
132
7.1.2
Imperfect versus Perfect Information
136
7.2
Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
137
7.2.1
Pure Strategies
137
7.2.2
Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies
139
7.2.3
Normal-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games
143
7.3
Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play
145
7.4
Summary
147
7.5
Exercises
147
Chapter
8
Credibility and Sequential Rationality
151
8.1
Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction
152
8.2
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Concept
153
8.3
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Examples
159
8.3.1
The Centipede Game
159
8.3.2
Stackelberg Competition
160
8.3.3
Mutually Assured Destruction
163
8.3.4
Time-Inconsistent Preferences
166
8.4
Summary
169
8.5
Exercises
170
Chapter
9
Multistage Games
175
9.1
Preliminaries
176
9.2
Payoffs
177
9.3
Strategies and Conditional Play
178
9.4
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
180
9.5
The One-Stage Deviation Principle
184
9.6
Summary
186
9.7
Exercises
186
viii
· Contents
Chapter
10
Repeated Games
190
10.1
Finitely Repeated Games
190
10.2
Infinitely Repeated Games
192
J
0.2.1
Payoffs
193
10.2.2
Strategies
195
10.3
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
196
10.4
Application: Tacit Collusion
201
10.5
Sequential Interaction and Reputation
204
10.5.1
Cooperation as Reputation
204
10.5.2
Third-Party Institutions as Reputation Mechanisms
205
10.5.3
Reputation Transfers without Third Parties
207
10.6
The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes
209
10.7
Summary
214
10.8
Exercises
215
Chapter
11
Strategic Bargaining
220
11.1
One Round of Bargaining: The Ultimatum Game
222
11.2
Finitely Many Rounds of Bargaining
224
11.3
The Infinite-Horizon Game
228
11.4
Application: Legislative Bargaining
229
11.4.1
Closed-Rule Bargaining
230
11.4.2
Open-Rule Bargaining
232
11.5
Summary
235
11.6
Exercises
236
PART IV Static Games of Incomplete Information
Chapter
12
Bayesian Games
241
12.1
Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games
246
12.1.1
Players, Actions, Information, and Preferences
246
12.1.2
Deriving
Poste rio
rs from a Common Prior:
A Players Beliefs
247
12.1.3
Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
249
12.2
Examples
252
12.2.1
Teenagers and the Game of Chicken
252
12.2.2
Study Groups
255
12.3
Inefficient Trade and Adverse Selection
258
12.4
Committee Voting
261
12.5
Mixed Strategies Revisited: Harsanyi s Interpretation
264
12.6
Summary
266
12.7
Exercises
266
Chapter
13
Auctions and Competitive Bidding
270
13.1
Independent Private Values
272
1
3.1.
1 Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
272
13.1.2
English Auctions Tib
13.1.3
First-Price Sealed-Bid and Dutch Auctions
276
13.1.4
Revenue Equivalence
279
13.2
Common Values and the Winner s Curse
282
Contents ·
¡x
13.3
Summary
285
13.4
Exercises
285
Chapter
14
Mechanism Design
288
14.1
Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games
288
14.1.1
The Players
288
14.1.2
The Mechanism Designer
289
14.1.3
The Mechanism Game
290
14.2
The Revelation Principle
292
14.3
Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
295
14.3.1
Dominant Strategy Implementation
295
14.3.2
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
295
14.4
Summary
299
14.5
Exercises
299
PART V Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Chapter
15
Sequential Rationality with
Incomplete Information
303
15.1
The Problem with
Subgame
Perfection
303
15.2
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
307
15.3
Sequential Equilibrium
312
15.4
Summary
314
15.5
Exercises
314
Chapter
16
Signaling Games
318
16.1
Education Signaling: The MBA Game
319
16.2
Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence
323
16.2.1
Separating Equilibria
324
16.2.2
Pooling Equilibria
330
16.3
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games
332
16.4
Summary
335
16.5
Exercises
335
Chapter
17
Building a Reputation
339
17.1
Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
339
17.2
Driving a Tough Bargain
342
17.3
A Reputation for Being Nice
349
17.4
Summary
354
17.5
Exercises
354
Chapter
18
Information Transmission and Cheap Talk
357
18.1
Information Transmission: A Finite Example
358
18.2
Information Transmission: The Continuous Case
361
18.3
Application: Information and Legislative Organization
365
18.4
Summary
367
18.5
Exercises
367
Contents
Chapter
19
Mathematical Appendix
369
19.1
Sets and Sequences
369
19.1.1
Basic Definitions
369
19.1.2
Basic Set Operations
370
19.2
Functions
371
19.2.1
Basic Definitions
371
19.2.2
Continuity
372
19.3
Calculus and Optimization
373
19.3.1
Basic Definitions
Ъ1Ъ
19.3.2
Differentiation and Optimization
374
19.3.3
Integration
377
19.4
Probability and Random Variables
378
19.4.1
Basic Definitions
378
19.4.2
Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions
379
19.4.3
Independence, Conditional Probability, and
Bayes
Rule
380
19.4.4
Expected Values
382
References
385
Index
389
This comprehensive textbook introduces readers
to the principal ideas and applications of game
theory, in a style that combines rigor with ac¬
cessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise
description of rational decision making, and goes
on to discuss strategic and extensive form games
with complete information, Bayesian games, and
extensive form games with imperfect information.
He covers a host of topics, including multistage
and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions,
rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling
games, reputation building, and information
transmission games. Unlike other books on game
theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality
and explores its implications for multiperson deci¬
sion problems through concepts like dominated
strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it
present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its
derivatives.
Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced
undergraduate and beginning graduate students.
Throughout, concepts and methods are explained
using real-world examples backed by precise
analytic material. The book features many
important applications to economics and political
science, as well as numerous exercises that focus
on how to formalize informal situations and then
analyze them.
•
Introduces the core ideas and applications of
game theory
•
Covers static and dynamic games, with
complete and incomplete information
•
Features a variety of examples, applications,
and exercises
•
Topics include repeated games, bargaining,
auctions, signaling, reputation, and information
transmission
•
Ideal for advanced undergraduate and begin¬
ning graduate students
•
Complete solutions freely available to teachers
at press.princeton.edu, with selected solutions
freely available to students
Steven Tadelis is associate professor and Barbara
and
Gerson
Bakar
Faculty Fellow at the Haas
School of Business at the University of California,
Berkeley, and a distinguished economist at eBay
Research Labs.
Steve Tadelis s Game Theory is an ideal textbook for
advanced undergraduates, and great preparation for
graduate work. It provides a clear, self-contained, and
rigorous treatment of all the key concepts, along with
interesting applications; it also introduces key technical
tools in a straightforward and intuitive way.
—Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University
Steven Tadelis
isa
leading scholar in applied game
theory, and his expertise shines through in this excellent
new text. Aimed at intermediate to advanced undergrad¬
uates, it presents and discusses the theory remarkably
clearly, at both the intuitive and formal levels.
—Steve Matthews, University of Pennsylvania
Steve Tadelis has written an up-to-date, comprehensive,
yet reader-friendly introductory textbook to game
theory. He explains difficult concepts in an exceptionally
clear and simple way, making the book accessible to
students with a minimal background in mathematics.
The abundance of examples and illustrations, drawing
from economics, political science, and business strategy,
not only shows the wide range of applications of game
theory, but also makes the book attractive and fun to
read. Tadelis s book will undoubtedly become a refer¬
ence textbook for a first course in game theory.
—
Francis Bloch,
École Polytechnique
These days, game theory plays an essential role not only
in economics, but in many other branches of social and
engineering science, as well as philosophy, biology, psy¬
chology, even law. In all these disciplines, students and
instructors alike should welcome this excellent resource
for mastering the key tools of modern game theory.
—Peter Hammond, University of Warwick
It s hard to write a game theory textbook that strikes a
good balance between precision and accessibility. But
Steve Tadelis has accomplished this juggling act, with
style and humor besides.
—Eric S.
Maskin,
Nobel Laureate in Economics,
Harvard University
Game theory is a powerful tool for understanding
strategic behavior in business, politics, and other set¬
tings. Steve Tadelis s text provides an ideal guide, taking
you from first principles of decision theory to models of
bargaining, auctions, signaling, and reputation building
in a style that is both rigorous and reader-friendly.
—Jonathan Levin, Stanford University
Game Theory fills a void in the literature, serving as a text
for an advanced undergraduate- or masters-level class. It
has more detail than most undergraduate texts, while still
being accessible to a broad audience and stopping short
of the more technical approach of PhD-level texts. This is
a valuable book, written by a meticulous scholar who is
an expert in the field.
—
Matthew
0.
Jackson, author of Social and Economic
Networks
о
о
г:
о
о
|
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| genre | (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Lehrbuch |
| id | DE-604.BV040707397 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T16:23:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780691129082 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2012025166 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025687798 |
| oclc_num | 828790453 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| physical | xvii, 396 Seiten graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Tadelis, Steve Game theory an introduction Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4123623-3 |
| title | Game theory an introduction |
| title_auth | Game theory an introduction |
| title_exact_search | Game theory an introduction |
| title_full | Game theory an introduction Steven Tadelis |
| title_fullStr | Game theory an introduction Steven Tadelis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory an introduction Steven Tadelis |
| title_short | Game theory |
| title_sort | game theory an introduction |
| title_sub | an introduction |
| topic | Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Game theory Spieltheorie Lehrbuch |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025687798&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=025687798&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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Inhaltsverzeichnis
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