Enforcement and corporate governance:
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3409 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3409 |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/23/2004 Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2004] |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (49 Seiten) |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Berglöf, Erik |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128734981 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Enforcement and corporate governance |c Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens |
| 264 | 1 | |a [Washington, D.C] |b World Bank |c 2004 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (49 Seiten) | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a Policy research working paper |v 3409 | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/23/2004 | ||
| 500 | |a Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2004] | ||
| 520 | 1 | |a "Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site | |
| 534 | |c 2004 | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Entwicklungsländer | |
| 653 | |a Corporate governance | ||
| 653 | |a Corporate governance |a Developing countries | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Claessens, Stijn |d 1959- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124365159 |4 aut | |
| 710 | 2 | |a World Bank |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Reproduktion von |a Berglöf, Erik |t Enforcement and corporate governance |d 2004 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Berglöf, Erik Claessens, Stijn 1959- |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-24T19:00:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (49 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spellingShingle | Berglöf, Erik Claessens, Stijn 1959- Enforcement and corporate governance Entwicklungsländer |
| title | Enforcement and corporate governance |
| title_auth | Enforcement and corporate governance |
| title_exact_search | Enforcement and corporate governance |
| title_full | Enforcement and corporate governance Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens |
| title_fullStr | Enforcement and corporate governance Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens |
| title_full_unstemmed | Enforcement and corporate governance Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens |
| title_short | Enforcement and corporate governance |
| title_sort | enforcement and corporate governance |
| topic | Entwicklungsländer |
| topic_facet | Entwicklungsländer |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3409 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bergloferik enforcementandcorporategovernance AT claessensstijn enforcementandcorporategovernance AT worldbank enforcementandcorporategovernance |