Truth as one and many:

What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose f...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person: Lynch, Michael P. 1966- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Oxford [u.a.] Clarendon Press 2009
Ausgabe:1. publ.
Schlagwörter:
Links:http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017104713&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
Zusammenfassung:What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references and index
Truisms -- Truth as one -- Truth as many -- Truth as one and many -- Truth, consequence, and the universality of reason -- Deflationism and explanation -- Expanding the view: semantic functionalism -- Applying the view: moral truth
Umfang:X, 205 S.
ISBN:9780199218738