Executive compensation: a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005
"We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
14145 |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14145.pdf |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data from the recent decades. First, the median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, even during times of rapid economic expansion and aggregate firm growth. This finding contrasts sharply with the steep upward trajectory of pay over the past thirty years, which coincided with a period of similarly large increases in aggregate firm size. A second surprising finding is that the sensitivity of an executive's wealth to firm performance was not inconsequentially small for most of our sample period. Thus, recent years were not the first time when compensation arrangements served to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders. Taken together, the long-run trends in the level and structure of compensation pose a challenge to several common explanations for the widely-debated surge in executive pay of the past several decades, including changes in firms' size, rent extraction by CEOs, and increases in managerial incentives"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
| Umfang: | 49 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 14145 | |
| 520 | 8 | |a "We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data from the recent decades. First, the median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, even during times of rapid economic expansion and aggregate firm growth. This finding contrasts sharply with the steep upward trajectory of pay over the past thirty years, which coincided with a period of similarly large increases in aggregate firm size. A second surprising finding is that the sensitivity of an executive's wealth to firm performance was not inconsequentially small for most of our sample period. Thus, recent years were not the first time when compensation arrangements served to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders. Taken together, the long-run trends in the level and structure of compensation pose a challenge to several common explanations for the widely-debated surge in executive pay of the past several decades, including changes in firms' size, rent extraction by CEOs, and increases in managerial incentives"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Saks, Raven E. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128974354 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Frydman, Carola Saks, Raven E. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128974354 |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)254889145 (DE-599)GBV572566603 |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV023594022 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:21Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016909352 |
| oclc_num | 254889145 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 49 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Frydman, Carola Verfasser aut Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 Carola Frydman ; Raven E. Saks Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008 49 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 14145 "We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data from the recent decades. First, the median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, even during times of rapid economic expansion and aggregate firm growth. This finding contrasts sharply with the steep upward trajectory of pay over the past thirty years, which coincided with a period of similarly large increases in aggregate firm size. A second surprising finding is that the sensitivity of an executive's wealth to firm performance was not inconsequentially small for most of our sample period. Thus, recent years were not the first time when compensation arrangements served to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders. Taken together, the long-run trends in the level and structure of compensation pose a challenge to several common explanations for the widely-debated surge in executive pay of the past several decades, including changes in firms' size, rent extraction by CEOs, and increases in managerial incentives"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site Saks, Raven E. Verfasser (DE-588)128974354 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 14145 (DE-604)BV002801238 14145 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14145.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Frydman, Carola Saks, Raven E. Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 |
| title | Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 |
| title_auth | Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 |
| title_exact_search | Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 |
| title_full | Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 Carola Frydman ; Raven E. Saks |
| title_fullStr | Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 Carola Frydman ; Raven E. Saks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Executive compensation a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 Carola Frydman ; Raven E. Saks |
| title_short | Executive compensation |
| title_sort | executive compensation a new view from a long term perspective 1936 2005 |
| title_sub | a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936 - 2005 |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14145.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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