Performance pay and wage inequality:

We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved productive...

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Beteiligte Personen: Lemieux, Thomas 1989- (VerfasserIn), MacLeod, William Bentley 1954- (VerfasserIn), Parent, Daniel (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007
Schriftenreihe:Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13128
Links:http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13128.pdf
Zusammenfassung:We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved productive characteristics of workers. Moreover, the growing incidence of performance-pay can explain 24 percent of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, and accounts for nearly all of the top-end growth in wage dispersion(above the 80th percentile).
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29
Umfang:45 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm