Trust and social collateral:
This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum amou...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13126 |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13126.pdf |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum amount that one can borrow from the other, and derive a simple reduced form expression for trust as a function of the social network. We show that trust is higher in more connected and more homogenous societies, and relate our trust measure to commonly used network statistics. Our model predicts that dense networks generate greater welfare when arrangements typically require high trust, and loose networks create more welfare otherwise. Using data on social networks and behavior in dictator games, we document evidence consistent with the quantitative predictions of the model. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 40 - 43 |
| Umfang: | 43, [8] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13126 | |
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| 520 | 8 | |a This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum amount that one can borrow from the other, and derive a simple reduced form expression for trust as a function of the social network. We show that trust is higher in more connected and more homogenous societies, and relate our trust measure to commonly used network statistics. Our model predicts that dense networks generate greater welfare when arrangements typically require high trust, and loose networks create more welfare otherwise. Using data on social networks and behavior in dictator games, we document evidence consistent with the quantitative predictions of the model. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Szeidl, Adam |d 1976- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128969806 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV023593036 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:19Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908366 |
| oclc_num | 255928077 |
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| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 43, [8] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Mobius, Markus 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)13275200X aut Trust and social collateral Markus Mobius ; Adam Szeidl Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 43, [8] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13126 Literaturverz. S. 40 - 43 This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum amount that one can borrow from the other, and derive a simple reduced form expression for trust as a function of the social network. We show that trust is higher in more connected and more homogenous societies, and relate our trust measure to commonly used network statistics. Our model predicts that dense networks generate greater welfare when arrangements typically require high trust, and loose networks create more welfare otherwise. Using data on social networks and behavior in dictator games, we document evidence consistent with the quantitative predictions of the model. Szeidl, Adam 1976- Verfasser (DE-588)128969806 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13126 (DE-604)BV002801238 13126 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13126.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Mobius, Markus 1971- Szeidl, Adam 1976- Trust and social collateral |
| title | Trust and social collateral |
| title_auth | Trust and social collateral |
| title_exact_search | Trust and social collateral |
| title_full | Trust and social collateral Markus Mobius ; Adam Szeidl |
| title_fullStr | Trust and social collateral Markus Mobius ; Adam Szeidl |
| title_full_unstemmed | Trust and social collateral Markus Mobius ; Adam Szeidl |
| title_short | Trust and social collateral |
| title_sort | trust and social collateral |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13126.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mobiusmarkus trustandsocialcollateral AT szeidladam trustandsocialcollateral |