Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks:
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11675 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11675.pdf |
| Abstract: | "Should a social planner treat observationally identical persons identically? This paper shows that uniform treatment is not necessarily desirable when a planner has only partial knowledge of treatment response. Then there may be reason to implement a fractional treatment rule, with positive fractions of the observationally identical persons receiving different treatments. The planning problems studied here share some important features: treatment is individualistic, social welfare is a strictly increasing function of a population mean outcome, and outcomes depend on an unknown state of nature. They differ in the information that the planner has about the state of nature and in how he uses this information to make treatment choices. In particular, I compare treatment choice using Bayes rules and the minimax-regret criterion. Following the analysis, I put aside the literal notion of a planner who makes decisions on behalf of society and consider the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment rules in functioning democracies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Umfang: | 25 S. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11675 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "Should a social planner treat observationally identical persons identically? This paper shows that uniform treatment is not necessarily desirable when a planner has only partial knowledge of treatment response. Then there may be reason to implement a fractional treatment rule, with positive fractions of the observationally identical persons receiving different treatments. The planning problems studied here share some important features: treatment is individualistic, social welfare is a strictly increasing function of a population mean outcome, and outcomes depend on an unknown state of nature. They differ in the information that the planner has about the state of nature and in how he uses this information to make treatment choices. In particular, I compare treatment choice using Bayes rules and the minimax-regret criterion. Following the analysis, I put aside the literal notion of a planner who makes decisions on behalf of society and consider the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment rules in functioning democracies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
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| author | Manski, Charles F. 1948- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128388447 |
| author_facet | Manski, Charles F. 1948- |
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| author_sort | Manski, Charles F. 1948- |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591716 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:17Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016907046 |
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| physical | 25 S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Manski, Charles F. 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)128388447 aut Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks Charles F. Manski Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 25 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11675 "Should a social planner treat observationally identical persons identically? This paper shows that uniform treatment is not necessarily desirable when a planner has only partial knowledge of treatment response. Then there may be reason to implement a fractional treatment rule, with positive fractions of the observationally identical persons receiving different treatments. The planning problems studied here share some important features: treatment is individualistic, social welfare is a strictly increasing function of a population mean outcome, and outcomes depend on an unknown state of nature. They differ in the information that the planner has about the state of nature and in how he uses this information to make treatment choices. In particular, I compare treatment choice using Bayes rules and the minimax-regret criterion. Following the analysis, I put aside the literal notion of a planner who makes decisions on behalf of society and consider the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment rules in functioning democracies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Social planning Methodology Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11675 (DE-604)BV002801238 11675 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11675.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Manski, Charles F. 1948- Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Social planning Methodology |
| title | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks |
| title_auth | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks |
| title_exact_search | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks |
| title_full | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks Charles F. Manski |
| title_fullStr | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks Charles F. Manski |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks Charles F. Manski |
| title_short | Fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks |
| title_sort | fractional treatment rules for social diversification of indivisible private risks |
| topic | Social planning Methodology |
| topic_facet | Social planning Methodology |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11675.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT manskicharlesf fractionaltreatmentrulesforsocialdiversificationofindivisibleprivaterisks |