Entry and competition in local hospital markets:
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11649 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11649.pdf |
| Abstract: | There has been considerable consolidation in the hospital industry in recent years. Over 900 deals occurred from 1994-2000, and many local markets, even in large urban areas, have been reduced to monopolies, duopolies, or triopolies. This surge in consolidation has led to concern about competition in local markets for hospital services. We examine the effect of market structure on competition in local hospital markets -- specifically, does the hardness of competition increase with the number of firms? We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market. The fourth entrant has little estimated effect. The use of quantity information allows us to infer that entry is consumer-surplus-increasing. |
| Umfang: | 55 S. Kt. |
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| 520 | 3 | |a There has been considerable consolidation in the hospital industry in recent years. Over 900 deals occurred from 1994-2000, and many local markets, even in large urban areas, have been reduced to monopolies, duopolies, or triopolies. This surge in consolidation has led to concern about competition in local markets for hospital services. We examine the effect of market structure on competition in local hospital markets -- specifically, does the hardness of competition increase with the number of firms? We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market. The fourth entrant has little estimated effect. The use of quantity information allows us to infer that entry is consumer-surplus-increasing. | |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:17Z |
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| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2005 |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Abraham, Jean 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)124571247 aut Entry and competition in local hospital markets Jean M. Abraham ; Martin S. Gaynor ; William B. Vogt Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 55 S. Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11649 There has been considerable consolidation in the hospital industry in recent years. Over 900 deals occurred from 1994-2000, and many local markets, even in large urban areas, have been reduced to monopolies, duopolies, or triopolies. This surge in consolidation has led to concern about competition in local markets for hospital services. We examine the effect of market structure on competition in local hospital markets -- specifically, does the hardness of competition increase with the number of firms? We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market. The fourth entrant has little estimated effect. The use of quantity information allows us to infer that entry is consumer-surplus-increasing. Economic Competition United States Health Facility Merger economics United States Hospital mergers United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals supply & distribution United States USA Gaynor, Martin 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)124571190 aut Vogt, William B. Verfasser (DE-588)124571166 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11649 (DE-604)BV002801238 11649 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11649.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Abraham, Jean 1973- Gaynor, Martin 1955- Vogt, William B. Entry and competition in local hospital markets National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Economic Competition United States Health Facility Merger economics United States Hospital mergers United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals supply & distribution United States |
| title | Entry and competition in local hospital markets |
| title_auth | Entry and competition in local hospital markets |
| title_exact_search | Entry and competition in local hospital markets |
| title_full | Entry and competition in local hospital markets Jean M. Abraham ; Martin S. Gaynor ; William B. Vogt |
| title_fullStr | Entry and competition in local hospital markets Jean M. Abraham ; Martin S. Gaynor ; William B. Vogt |
| title_full_unstemmed | Entry and competition in local hospital markets Jean M. Abraham ; Martin S. Gaynor ; William B. Vogt |
| title_short | Entry and competition in local hospital markets |
| title_sort | entry and competition in local hospital markets |
| topic | Economic Competition United States Health Facility Merger economics United States Hospital mergers United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals supply & distribution United States |
| topic_facet | Economic Competition United States Health Facility Merger economics United States Hospital mergers United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals supply & distribution United States USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11649.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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