A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics:
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11014 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11014.pdf |
| Abstract: | "We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Umfang: | 35 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11014 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Wirtschaftspolitik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic policy |x Political aspects | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Protectionism |x Political aspects | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Helpman, Elhanan |d 1946- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)12493563X |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Grossman, Gene M. 1955- Helpman, Elhanan 1946- |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591229 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906559 |
| oclc_num | 57424345 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 35 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Grossman, Gene M. 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)124935583 aut A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics Gene M. Grossman ; Elhanan Helpman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 35 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11014 "We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Political aspects Protectionism Political aspects Helpman, Elhanan 1946- Verfasser (DE-588)12493563X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11014 (DE-604)BV002801238 11014 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11014.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Grossman, Gene M. 1955- Helpman, Elhanan 1946- A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Political aspects Protectionism Political aspects |
| title | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics |
| title_auth | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics |
| title_exact_search | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics |
| title_full | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics Gene M. Grossman ; Elhanan Helpman |
| title_fullStr | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics Gene M. Grossman ; Elhanan Helpman |
| title_full_unstemmed | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics Gene M. Grossman ; Elhanan Helpman |
| title_short | A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics |
| title_sort | a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics |
| topic | Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Political aspects Protectionism Political aspects |
| topic_facet | Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Political aspects Protectionism Political aspects |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11014.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grossmangenem aprotectionistbiasinmajoritarianpolitics AT helpmanelhanan aprotectionistbiasinmajoritarianpolitics |