When do firms hire lobbyists?: the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
10533 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10553.pdf |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC. |
| Umfang: | 27, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 10533 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC. | |
| 610 | 1 | 4 | |a United States / Communications Commission |
| 650 | 4 | |a Interessenpolitik / Aufsichtsbehörde / Transaktionskosten / USA | |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kim, James J. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)13139312X |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 10533 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 10553 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10553.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Figueiredo, John M. de Kim, James J. |
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| id | DE-604.BV023590698 |
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| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:14Z |
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| language | English |
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| physical | 27, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Figueiredo, John M. de Verfasser (DE-588)124527272 aut When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission John M. de Figueiredo ; James J. Kim Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 27, [6] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10533 This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC. United States / Communications Commission Interessenpolitik / Aufsichtsbehörde / Transaktionskosten / USA USA Kim, James J. Verfasser (DE-588)13139312X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10533 (DE-604)BV002801238 10553 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10553.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Figueiredo, John M. de Kim, James J. When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series United States / Communications Commission Interessenpolitik / Aufsichtsbehörde / Transaktionskosten / USA |
| title | When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_auth | When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_exact_search | When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_full | When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission John M. de Figueiredo ; James J. Kim |
| title_fullStr | When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission John M. de Figueiredo ; James J. Kim |
| title_full_unstemmed | When do firms hire lobbyists? the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission John M. de Figueiredo ; James J. Kim |
| title_short | When do firms hire lobbyists? |
| title_sort | when do firms hire lobbyists the organization of lobbying at the federal communications commission |
| title_sub | the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| topic | United States / Communications Commission Interessenpolitik / Aufsichtsbehörde / Transaktionskosten / USA |
| topic_facet | United States / Communications Commission Interessenpolitik / Aufsichtsbehörde / Transaktionskosten / USA USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10553.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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