Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition: theory and evidence
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11085 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11085.pdf |
| Abstract: | "We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences for different types of government spending. Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Umfang: | 27, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a "We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences for different types of government spending. Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV019889723 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T12:08:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013213750 |
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| physical | 27, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Drazen, Allan 1950- Verfasser (DE-588)124929427 aut Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence Allan Drazen ; Marcela Eslava Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 27, [6] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11085 "We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences for different types of government spending. Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Elections Economic aspects United States Econometric models Government spending policy United States USA Eslava, Marcela 1975- Verfasser (DE-588)129260983 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11085 (DE-604)BV002801238 11085 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11085.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Drazen, Allan 1950- Eslava, Marcela 1975- Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Elections Economic aspects United States Econometric models Government spending policy United States |
| title | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence |
| title_auth | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence |
| title_exact_search | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence |
| title_full | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence Allan Drazen ; Marcela Eslava |
| title_fullStr | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence Allan Drazen ; Marcela Eslava |
| title_full_unstemmed | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence Allan Drazen ; Marcela Eslava |
| title_short | Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition |
| title_sort | electoral manipulation via expenditure composition theory and evidence |
| title_sub | theory and evidence |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Elections Economic aspects United States Econometric models Government spending policy United States |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Elections Economic aspects United States Econometric models Government spending policy United States USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11085.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT drazenallan electoralmanipulationviaexpenditurecompositiontheoryandevidence AT eslavamarcela electoralmanipulationviaexpenditurecompositiontheoryandevidence |