Individual strategy and social structure: an evolutionary theory of institutions
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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person: Young, H. Peyton 1945- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Princeton, NJ Princeton Univ. Press 1998
Schlagwörter:
Links:http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/97041419.html
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/97041419.html
Abstract:Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reasontheir way through even the most complex economic problems. In IndividualStrategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. Itcan serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
Beschreibung:Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
Umfang:XIII, 189 S. graph. Darst.
ISBN:069102684X
9780691086873
0691086877