Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment?:
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1998
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6361 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6361.pdf |
| Abstract: | When judges have discretion over fines and prison terms, sentencing exhibits a tendency toward efficiency: fines are larger, and prison terms shorter, for offenders with greater ability to pay. Sentencing guidelines place fairly rigid upper and lower limits on fines and prison terms and may inhibit the achievement of efficiency in sentencing. Preventing judges from substituting fines for prison terms may raise the cost of imposing punishment. The objective of this paper is to measure the efficiency cost of sentencing guidelines using data on federal offenders sentenced" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We find evidence that the guidelines raise the cost of punishment by nearly 5 percent of the total imprisonment cost of federal offenders. Not surprisingly, constraints on cost minimization raise costs. |
| Umfang: | 24 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV011861741 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20200305 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 980331s1998 xxud||| |||| 00||| engod | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)38542962 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV011861741 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-19 |a DE-521 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Meade, Jose |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)171718585 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? |c Jose Meade ; Joel Waldfogel |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |c 1998 | |
| 300 | |a 24 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6361 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a When judges have discretion over fines and prison terms, sentencing exhibits a tendency toward efficiency: fines are larger, and prison terms shorter, for offenders with greater ability to pay. Sentencing guidelines place fairly rigid upper and lower limits on fines and prison terms and may inhibit the achievement of efficiency in sentencing. Preventing judges from substituting fines for prison terms may raise the cost of imposing punishment. The objective of this paper is to measure the efficiency cost of sentencing guidelines using data on federal offenders sentenced" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We find evidence that the guidelines raise the cost of punishment by nearly 5 percent of the total imprisonment cost of federal offenders. Not surprisingly, constraints on cost minimization raise costs. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Emprisonnement - États-Unis - Coût - Modèles économétriques |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Sentences (procédure pénale) - Aspect économique - États-Unis |2 ram | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Imprisonment |z United States |x Costs |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Sentences (Criminal procedure) |x Economic aspects |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Waldfogel, Joel |d 1962- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124748112 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6361 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 6361 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6361.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008013271 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818954312831729664 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Meade, Jose Waldfogel, Joel 1962- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)171718585 (DE-588)124748112 |
| author_facet | Meade, Jose Waldfogel, Joel 1962- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Meade, Jose |
| author_variant | j m jm j w jw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV011861741 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB1 |
| callnumber-raw | HB1 |
| callnumber-search | HB1 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)38542962 (DE-599)BVBBV011861741 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02434nam a2200409 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV011861741</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20200305 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">980331s1998 xxud||| |||| 00||| engod</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)38542962</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV011861741</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Meade, Jose</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)171718585</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment?</subfield><subfield code="c">Jose Meade ; Joel Waldfogel</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="c">1998</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">24 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">6361</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">When judges have discretion over fines and prison terms, sentencing exhibits a tendency toward efficiency: fines are larger, and prison terms shorter, for offenders with greater ability to pay. Sentencing guidelines place fairly rigid upper and lower limits on fines and prison terms and may inhibit the achievement of efficiency in sentencing. Preventing judges from substituting fines for prison terms may raise the cost of imposing punishment. The objective of this paper is to measure the efficiency cost of sentencing guidelines using data on federal offenders sentenced" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We find evidence that the guidelines raise the cost of punishment by nearly 5 percent of the total imprisonment cost of federal offenders. Not surprisingly, constraints on cost minimization raise costs.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Emprisonnement - États-Unis - Coût - Modèles économétriques</subfield><subfield code="2">ram</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Sentences (procédure pénale) - Aspect économique - États-Unis</subfield><subfield code="2">ram</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ökonometrisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Imprisonment</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Costs</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Sentences (Criminal procedure)</subfield><subfield code="x">Economic aspects</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Waldfogel, Joel</subfield><subfield code="d">1962-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124748112</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">6361</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">6361</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6361.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008013271</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV011861741 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T10:20:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008013271 |
| oclc_num | 38542962 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 24 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publishDateSearch | 1998 |
| publishDateSort | 1998 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Meade, Jose Verfasser (DE-588)171718585 aut Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? Jose Meade ; Joel Waldfogel Cambridge, Mass. 1998 24 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6361 When judges have discretion over fines and prison terms, sentencing exhibits a tendency toward efficiency: fines are larger, and prison terms shorter, for offenders with greater ability to pay. Sentencing guidelines place fairly rigid upper and lower limits on fines and prison terms and may inhibit the achievement of efficiency in sentencing. Preventing judges from substituting fines for prison terms may raise the cost of imposing punishment. The objective of this paper is to measure the efficiency cost of sentencing guidelines using data on federal offenders sentenced" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We find evidence that the guidelines raise the cost of punishment by nearly 5 percent of the total imprisonment cost of federal offenders. Not surprisingly, constraints on cost minimization raise costs. Emprisonnement - États-Unis - Coût - Modèles économétriques ram Sentences (procédure pénale) - Aspect économique - États-Unis ram Ökonometrisches Modell Imprisonment United States Costs Econometric models Sentences (Criminal procedure) Economic aspects United States Econometric models USA Waldfogel, Joel 1962- Verfasser (DE-588)124748112 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6361 (DE-604)BV002801238 6361 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6361.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Meade, Jose Waldfogel, Joel 1962- Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Emprisonnement - États-Unis - Coût - Modèles économétriques ram Sentences (procédure pénale) - Aspect économique - États-Unis ram Ökonometrisches Modell Imprisonment United States Costs Econometric models Sentences (Criminal procedure) Economic aspects United States Econometric models |
| title | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? |
| title_auth | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? |
| title_exact_search | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? |
| title_full | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? Jose Meade ; Joel Waldfogel |
| title_fullStr | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? Jose Meade ; Joel Waldfogel |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? Jose Meade ; Joel Waldfogel |
| title_short | Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment? |
| title_sort | do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment |
| topic | Emprisonnement - États-Unis - Coût - Modèles économétriques ram Sentences (procédure pénale) - Aspect économique - États-Unis ram Ökonometrisches Modell Imprisonment United States Costs Econometric models Sentences (Criminal procedure) Economic aspects United States Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Emprisonnement - États-Unis - Coût - Modèles économétriques Sentences (procédure pénale) - Aspect économique - États-Unis Ökonometrisches Modell Imprisonment United States Costs Econometric models Sentences (Criminal procedure) Economic aspects United States Econometric models USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6361.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT meadejose dosentencingguidelinesraisethecostofpunishment AT waldfogeljoel dosentencingguidelinesraisethecostofpunishment |