The cooperator's dilemma:
The Cooperator's Dilemma provides a remarkably up-to-date and comprehensive statement and assessment of collective action thinking. It will be important reading for the diverse and growing audience of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists who are interested in collec...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ann Arbor
Univ. of Michigan Press
1996
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Economics, cognition, and society
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007419212&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Zusammenfassung: | The Cooperator's Dilemma provides a remarkably up-to-date and comprehensive statement and assessment of collective action thinking. It will be important reading for the diverse and growing audience of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists who are interested in collective action and Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma issues and research |
| Abstract: | Over the past twenty-five years, theorists have proposed over two dozen different sets of solutions to the Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma game. The book employs a fourfold typology of market, community, contract, and hierarchy to sort these solutions and investigate whether they actually produce cooperation. Further, it uses two analytical standards for evaluating proposed solutions: a solution must be complete in that it alone turns inaction to action and consistent in that it develops out of the pecuniary self-interest kernel of the program. It turns out that these standards are in conflict: if we try to make collective action theories logically complete, they become logically inconsistent; if we try to make them consistent, they become incomplete. Professor Lichbach demonstrates how this trade-off forces us to delimit the scope and boundaries of collective action theories and to appreciate how they might be combined with culturalist and institutionalist approaches |
| Umfang: | XX, 309 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0472105728 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The cooperator's dilemma |c Mark Irving Lichbach |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ann Arbor |b Univ. of Michigan Press |c 1996 | |
| 300 | |a XX, 309 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a Economics, cognition, and society | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Over the past twenty-five years, theorists have proposed over two dozen different sets of solutions to the Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma game. The book employs a fourfold typology of market, community, contract, and hierarchy to sort these solutions and investigate whether they actually produce cooperation. Further, it uses two analytical standards for evaluating proposed solutions: a solution must be complete in that it alone turns inaction to action and consistent in that it develops out of the pecuniary self-interest kernel of the program. It turns out that these standards are in conflict: if we try to make collective action theories logically complete, they become logically inconsistent; if we try to make them consistent, they become incomplete. Professor Lichbach demonstrates how this trade-off forces us to delimit the scope and boundaries of collective action theories and to appreciate how they might be combined with culturalist and institutionalist approaches | |
| 520 | |a The Cooperator's Dilemma provides a remarkably up-to-date and comprehensive statement and assessment of collective action thinking. It will be important reading for the diverse and growing audience of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists who are interested in collective action and Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma issues and research | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Collectief handelen |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Prisoners Dilemma Game |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Public Choice |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Theorieën |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Collective behavior | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Social choice | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Kollektiventscheidung |0 (DE-588)4022393-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819289868911509504 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Exhibits xix
Abbreviations xxi
Part 1 Problems
Chapter 1 Argument 3
1.1. The Collective Action Argument 3
1.2. Challenges and Rejoinders to Collective Action Ideas 6
1.3. Solutions to the Collective Action Problem 13
1.4. Evaluating the Collective Action Research Program 24
1.4.1. Logical Completeness 25
1.4.2. Logical Consistency 27
Chapter 2 Formalization 31
2.1. The Canonical Public Good Prisoner s Dilemma Game 31
2.1.1. Public Goods 33
2.1.2. Prisoner s Dilemmas 37
2.1.3. Public Goods and Prisoner s Dilemmas 39
2.2. Variations on the Canonical Case 46
2.2.1. Other Games 46
2.2.2. Other Goods 48
2.2.3. Other Games and Goods 50
2.3. Other Formalizations 51
2.3.1. A Microeconomic Formalization 51
2.3.2. An Expected Value Formalization 52
2.4. The Basic Results 54
2.5. Some Contrasting Theories 62
Part 2 Solutions
Chapter 3 Market 67
3.1. Increase Benefits 68
3.2. Lower Costs 70
xvi The Cooperator s Dilemma
3.3. Increase Resources 71
3.4. Improve the Productivity of Tactics 71
3.5. Reduce the Supply of the Public Good 73
3.6. Increase the Probability of Winning 73
3.7. Increase the Probability of Making a Difference 76
3.8. Use Incomplete Information 78
3.9. Increase Risk Taking 80
3.10. Increase Team Competition between Enemies 82
3.11. Restrict Exit 83
3.12. Change the Type of Public Good 84
3.12.1. Seek Public Bads 84
3.12.2. Seek Nonrival Public Goods 85
3.13. An Evaluation of the Market Solution 85
Chapter 4 Community 89
4.1. Common Knowledge: Overcome Mutual Ignorance 89
4.1.1. Simultaneous Choice: Increase
Mutual Expectations 89
4.1.2. Sequential Choice: Build a Bandwagon 95
4.2. Common Values: Overcome Pecuniary Self interest 98
4.2.1. Process Orientation 105
4.2.1.1. Self Actualizing Political Experience 108
4.2.1.2. Entertainment Value 109
4.2.1.3. Conformism/Rebellion in Actions 109
4.2.1.4. Means Are Ends 110
4.2.1.5. Costs Are Benefits 111
4.2.2. Other Regardingness 112
4.2.2.1. Altruism 115
4.2.2.2. Express an Ethical Preference 116
4.2.2.3. Kantian Ethics 117
4.2.2.4. Fairness 117
4.2.2.5. Communal Consciousness 118
4.2.2.6. Social Incentives 120
4.3. An Evaluation of the Community Solution 121
Chapter 5 Contract 129
5.1. Self Government 130
5.2. Tit For Tat 131
5.2.1. Trigger Strategies 132
5.2.2. Tit For Tat 134
5.2.3. Interpretations 138
5.3. Mutual Exchange 141
5.4. An Evaluation of the Contract Solution 146
Contents xvii
Chapter 6 Hierarchy 155
6.1. Locate Agents or Entrepreneurs 155
6.1.1. The Agency Relationship 158
6.1.2. Problems 158
6.1.3. Origins 162
6.1.4. Solutions 164
6.2. Locate Principals or Patrons 171
6.3. Reorganize 172
6.3.1. Become Clubbish: Form an Exclusionary Club 172
6.3.2. Become Effective: Shape an Efficacious Group 179
6.3.3. Become Decentralized: Create a
Federal Structure 187
6.4. Increase Team Competition among Allies 187
6.5. Impose, Monitor, and Enforce Agreements 188
6.5.1. Impose Agreements 189
6.5.2. Monitor Defections 191
6.5.3. Administer Selective Incentives
and Disincentives 193
6.6. An Evaluation of the Hierarchy Solution 195
Part 3 Appraisals
Chapter 7 Completeness 207
7.1. Any One Solution Must Be an Incomplete
Explanation of Collective Action 207
7.1.1. Market 208
7.1.2. Community 211
7.1.3. Contract 213
7.1.4. Hierarchy 216
7.2. Combinations of Solutions Must Be
Required to Explain Collective Action 219
7.3. The Popper Hayek Combination 223
Chapter 8 Consistency 227
8.1. Challenges to Rationality 227
8.2. Expanding Rationality 235
Chapter 9 Boundaries 241
Appendix The Prisoner s Dilemma 247
Notes 249
xviii The Cooperator s Dilemma
References 267
Author Index 297
Subject Index 305
|
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| discipline | Soziologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV011075323 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T10:05:53Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0472105728 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007419212 |
| oclc_num | 32508054 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-20 DE-945 DE-634 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-20 DE-945 DE-634 DE-11 |
| physical | XX, 309 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publishDateSearch | 1996 |
| publishDateSort | 1996 |
| publisher | Univ. of Michigan Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Economics, cognition, and society |
| spellingShingle | Lichbach, Mark Irving 1951- The cooperator's dilemma Collectief handelen gtt Prisoners Dilemma Game gtt Public Choice gtt Theorieën gtt Collective behavior Social choice Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Kollektives Verhalten (DE-588)4130047-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4130047-6 |
| title | The cooperator's dilemma |
| title_auth | The cooperator's dilemma |
| title_exact_search | The cooperator's dilemma |
| title_full | The cooperator's dilemma Mark Irving Lichbach |
| title_fullStr | The cooperator's dilemma Mark Irving Lichbach |
| title_full_unstemmed | The cooperator's dilemma Mark Irving Lichbach |
| title_short | The cooperator's dilemma |
| title_sort | the cooperator s dilemma |
| topic | Collectief handelen gtt Prisoners Dilemma Game gtt Public Choice gtt Theorieën gtt Collective behavior Social choice Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Kollektives Verhalten (DE-588)4130047-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Collectief handelen Prisoners Dilemma Game Public Choice Theorieën Collective behavior Social choice Kollektiventscheidung Kollektives Verhalten |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007419212&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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