Employer learning and the signaling value of education:
If profit maximizing firms have limited information about the general productivity of new workers, they may choose to use easily observable characteristics such as years of education to 'statistically discriminate' among workers. The pure credential value of education will depend on how qu...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1996
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
5438 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5438.pdf |
| Zusammenfassung: | If profit maximizing firms have limited information about the general productivity of new workers, they may choose to use easily observable characteristics such as years of education to 'statistically discriminate' among workers. The pure credential value of education will depend on how quickly firms learn. To obtain information on employer learning, we work with a wage equation that contains both the interaction between experience and a hard-to-observe variable that is positively related to productivity and the interaction between experience and a variable that firms can easily observe, such as years of education. The time path of the coefficient on the unobservable productivity variable provides information about the rate at which employers learn about worker productivity. Using data from the NLSY we obtain preliminary estimates of the rate at which employers learn about worker quality and use these, along with some strong auxiliary assumptions, to explore the empirical relevance of the educational screening hypothesis. We show that even if employers learn relatively slowly about the productivity of new workers, the portion of the return to education that could reflect signaling of ability is limited. |
| Umfang: | 29 S. |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Employer learning and the signaling value of education |c Joseph G. Altonji ; Charles R. Pierret |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |c 1996 | |
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| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 5438 | |
| 520 | |a If profit maximizing firms have limited information about the general productivity of new workers, they may choose to use easily observable characteristics such as years of education to 'statistically discriminate' among workers. The pure credential value of education will depend on how quickly firms learn. To obtain information on employer learning, we work with a wage equation that contains both the interaction between experience and a hard-to-observe variable that is positively related to productivity and the interaction between experience and a variable that firms can easily observe, such as years of education. The time path of the coefficient on the unobservable productivity variable provides information about the rate at which employers learn about worker productivity. Using data from the NLSY we obtain preliminary estimates of the rate at which employers learn about worker quality and use these, along with some strong auxiliary assumptions, to explore the empirical relevance of the educational screening hypothesis. We show that even if employers learn relatively slowly about the productivity of new workers, the portion of the return to education that could reflect signaling of ability is limited. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Erziehung | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Education |x Economic aspects | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Labor productivity |x Evaluation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Productivity accounting | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Pierret, Charles R. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 5438 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 5438 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5438.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007196944 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Altonji, Joseph G. 1953- Pierret, Charles R. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128689943 |
| author_facet | Altonji, Joseph G. 1953- Pierret, Charles R. |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Altonji, Joseph G. 1953- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV010776136 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | H62 |
| callnumber-raw | H62.5.U5 |
| callnumber-search | H62.5.U5 |
| callnumber-sort | H 262.5 U5 |
| callnumber-subject | H - Social Science |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)34332553 (DE-599)BVBBV010776136 |
| dewey-full | 331.118 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 331 - Labor economics |
| dewey-raw | 331.118 |
| dewey-search | 331.118 |
| dewey-sort | 3331.118 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV010776136 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T10:00:29Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007196944 |
| oclc_num | 34332553 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 29 S. |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publishDateSearch | 1996 |
| publishDateSort | 1996 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Altonji, Joseph G. 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)128689943 aut Employer learning and the signaling value of education Joseph G. Altonji ; Charles R. Pierret Cambridge, Mass. 1996 29 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 5438 If profit maximizing firms have limited information about the general productivity of new workers, they may choose to use easily observable characteristics such as years of education to 'statistically discriminate' among workers. The pure credential value of education will depend on how quickly firms learn. To obtain information on employer learning, we work with a wage equation that contains both the interaction between experience and a hard-to-observe variable that is positively related to productivity and the interaction between experience and a variable that firms can easily observe, such as years of education. The time path of the coefficient on the unobservable productivity variable provides information about the rate at which employers learn about worker productivity. Using data from the NLSY we obtain preliminary estimates of the rate at which employers learn about worker quality and use these, along with some strong auxiliary assumptions, to explore the empirical relevance of the educational screening hypothesis. We show that even if employers learn relatively slowly about the productivity of new workers, the portion of the return to education that could reflect signaling of ability is limited. Erziehung Education Economic aspects Labor productivity Evaluation Productivity accounting Pierret, Charles R. Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 5438 (DE-604)BV002801238 5438 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5438.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Altonji, Joseph G. 1953- Pierret, Charles R. Employer learning and the signaling value of education National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Erziehung Education Economic aspects Labor productivity Evaluation Productivity accounting |
| title | Employer learning and the signaling value of education |
| title_auth | Employer learning and the signaling value of education |
| title_exact_search | Employer learning and the signaling value of education |
| title_full | Employer learning and the signaling value of education Joseph G. Altonji ; Charles R. Pierret |
| title_fullStr | Employer learning and the signaling value of education Joseph G. Altonji ; Charles R. Pierret |
| title_full_unstemmed | Employer learning and the signaling value of education Joseph G. Altonji ; Charles R. Pierret |
| title_short | Employer learning and the signaling value of education |
| title_sort | employer learning and the signaling value of education |
| topic | Erziehung Education Economic aspects Labor productivity Evaluation Productivity accounting |
| topic_facet | Erziehung Education Economic aspects Labor productivity Evaluation Productivity accounting |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5438.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT altonjijosephg employerlearningandthesignalingvalueofeducation AT pierretcharlesr employerlearningandthesignalingvalueofeducation |