On the number and size of nations:

This paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of political jurisdictions in different political regimes, democratic or not, and in different economic environments, with more or less economic integration. We focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions in terms...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte Personen: Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 (VerfasserIn), Spolaore, Enrico (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. 1995
Schriftenreihe:NBER working paper series 5050
Schlagwörter:
Links:http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2685
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5050
Zusammenfassung:This paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of political jurisdictions in different political regimes, democratic or not, and in different economic environments, with more or less economic integration. We focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions in terms of economies of scale and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations. Our model implies that: i) democratization leads to secessions; ii) without an appropriate redistributive scheme (which we characterize) in equilibrium one observes an inefficiently large number of countries; iii) the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in
Umfang:48 S.