The mind doesn't work that way: the scope and limits of computational psychology
Annotation
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Main Author: | |
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
MIT Press
©2001
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Series: | Representation and mind
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Links: | https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4627.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy |
Summary: | Annotation |
Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (126 Seiten) |
ISBN: | 0262272903 9780262272902 |
Staff View
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520 | 8 | |a Annotation |b In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works). Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started. | |
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spelling | Fodor, Jerry A. The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology Jerry Fodor Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press ©2001 1 Online-Ressource (126 Seiten) txt c cr Representation and mind Annotation In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works). Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started. Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 0262561468 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262561464 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 0262062127 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262062121 |
spellingShingle | Fodor, Jerry A. The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology |
title | The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology |
title_auth | The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology |
title_exact_search | The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology |
title_full | The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology Jerry Fodor |
title_fullStr | The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology Jerry Fodor |
title_full_unstemmed | The mind doesn't work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology Jerry Fodor |
title_short | The mind doesn't work that way |
title_sort | mind doesn t work that way the scope and limits of computational psychology |
title_sub | the scope and limits of computational psychology |
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