Designing economic mechanisms:
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desire...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2006
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| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754258 |
| Zusammenfassung: | A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied. |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 344 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780511754258 |
Internformat
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| indexdate | 2025-03-03T11:58:06Z |
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| spelling | Hurwicz, Leonid Designing economic mechanisms Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 344 Seiten) txt c cr A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied. Reiter, Stanley Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780521724104 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780521836418 |
| spellingShingle | Hurwicz, Leonid Designing economic mechanisms |
| title | Designing economic mechanisms |
| title_auth | Designing economic mechanisms |
| title_exact_search | Designing economic mechanisms |
| title_full | Designing economic mechanisms Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter |
| title_fullStr | Designing economic mechanisms Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter |
| title_full_unstemmed | Designing economic mechanisms Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter |
| title_short | Designing economic mechanisms |
| title_sort | designing economic mechanisms |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hurwiczleonid designingeconomicmechanisms AT reiterstanley designingeconomicmechanisms |