Silicon Triangle: the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere beteiligte Personen: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Stanford
Hoover Institution Press
2023
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Umfang: | 424 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780817926151 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Silicon Triangle |b the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| 250 | |a 1st ed | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Stanford |b Hoover Institution Press |c 2023 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2023 | |
| 300 | |a 424 Seiten | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semiconductor industry--Taiwan | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Diamond, Larry |d 1951- |0 (DE-588)12932423X |4 edt | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ellis, James O. |4 edt | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Schell, Orville |d 1940- |0 (DE-588)1057629901 |4 edt | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Diamond, Larry |t Silicon Triangle |z 9780817926151 |d Chicago : Hoover Institution Press,c2023 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |z 978-0-8179-2616-8 |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035505739 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1824302113621016576 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author2 | Diamond, Larry 1951- Ellis, James O. Schell, Orville 1940- |
| author2_role | edt edt edt |
| author2_variant | l d ld j o e jo joe o s os |
| author_GND | (DE-588)12932423X (DE-588)1057629901 |
| author_facet | Diamond, Larry 1951- Ellis, James O. Schell, Orville 1940- |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV050169791 |
| contents | Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV050169791 |
| dewey-full | 338.4/7621381520973 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
| dewey-raw | 338.4/7621381520973 |
| dewey-search | 338.4/7621381520973 |
| dewey-sort | 3338.4 137621381520973 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1st ed |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV050169791 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-02-17T11:01:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780817926151 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035505739 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-11 |
| physical | 424 Seiten |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Hoover Institution Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security 1st ed Stanford Hoover Institution Press 2023 ©2023 424 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan Diamond, Larry 1951- (DE-588)12932423X edt Ellis, James O. edt Schell, Orville 1940- (DE-588)1057629901 edt Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Diamond, Larry Silicon Triangle 9780817926151 Chicago : Hoover Institution Press,c2023 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-8179-2616-8 |
| spellingShingle | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security Intro -- Plaque -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Executive Summary -- 1. Near-Term Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Long-Term Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Introduction -- The Silicon Triangle -- The End of the Beginning -- Uneasy Questions -- Deterrence -- Notes -- CHapter One: Scenarios for Future US-China Competition -- Driving Forces -- Our Scenarios -- Scenario No. 1 for 2032: "Cold War 2.0" (NW) -- Scenario No. 2 for 2032: "Great-Power Happy Hour" (NE) -- Scenario No. 3 for 2032: "Downward Spiral (in US-China Relations)" (SW) -- Scenario No. 4 for 2032: The China Dream (SE) -- Probable and Preferable Scenarios and Dynamics -- Scenario Implications and Principles -- Notes -- CHapter Two: Implications of Technology Trends in the Semiconductor Industry -- Chip Types and Uses -- Defense Needs -- The Commercial Semiconductor Value Chain -- Trends in Commercial Technology -- Trends in Research and Development -- Trends in Workforce -- Notes -- CHAPTER THREE: An Insurance Policy for Dependence of US Supply Chains on Foreign Providers -- US Semiconductor Strengths -- US Semiconductor Supply Chain Weaknesses and Vulnerability -- Recent Policy and Industry Responses -- Novel Public Measures to Improve US Chip Supply Chain Resiliency -- Notes -- CHAPTER FOUR: A Long-Term Competitiveness Strategy for US Domestic Semiconductor Technology -- Defining a US Policy Objective: Strategic Autonomy via the Control of Critical Technologies -- Why Is the United States No Longer in a Position of Assured Technology Leadership? -- Policies to Achieve US Strategic Autonomy through Semiconductor Leadership -- 1. Policies to Enhance Value Capture -- 2. Policies to Strengthen National and Economic Security -- 3. Policies to Amplify Value Creation 4. Policies to Strengthen the Global Appropriability Regime -- Achieving Strategic Autonomy -- Notes -- CHAPTER FIVE: Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors -- Learning from the Rise of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan -- Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry Today: Clustering and Limits to Growth -- Postcards from the Future: For Taiwan, Economics and Security Have Always Been Linked -- US-Taiwan Cooperation on Semiconductors to Preserve Stability in the Taiwan Strait -- Notes -- Chapter Six: US Allies, Partners, and Friends -- Japan -- South Korea -- Europe -- Southeast Asia -- India -- Israel -- Notes -- Chapter Seven: Jointly Deterring Beijing through Semiconductors -- Constraining Beijing's Ambitions -- An Example: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Subsystems -- "COCOM" 2.0 -- Enforcement -- Eroding Beijing's Confidence in War -- Notes -- Chapter EIght: China's Lagging Techno-Nationalism -- Industry Origins in Techno-Nationalism -- Doubling Down after 2014 -- Today's Mixed Results -- What Held China Back? -- Looking Ahead -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter Nine: Mitigating the Impact of China's Nonmarket Behavior in Semiconductors -- Warning Signs -- Geopolitics/Geoeconomics -- China's Ends, America's Means -- China's Response -- Strategy One: Increased Investment -- Strategy Two: Work-Arounds -- Strategy Three: Outreach to US Allies -- Strategy Four: Play for Time -- Strategy Five: Frame Narratives -- Cowed but Unbowed -- The Next Challenge -- Notes -- Conclusion and Discussion of Recommendations -- 1. Domestic Resilience -- 2. Business Environment -- 3. Technological Competitiveness -- 4. Taiwan's Stability -- 5. Dealing with China -- Working Group Participants -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Index Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan |
| title | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_auth | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_exact_search | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_full | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_fullStr | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_full_unstemmed | Silicon Triangle the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| title_short | Silicon Triangle |
| title_sort | silicon triangle the united states taiwan china and global semiconductor security |
| title_sub | the United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security |
| topic | Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan |
| topic_facet | Semiconductor industry--Political aspects--United States Semiconductors--Political aspects--United States Semiconductor industry--Taiwan |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT diamondlarry silicontriangletheunitedstatestaiwanchinaandglobalsemiconductorsecurity AT ellisjameso silicontriangletheunitedstatestaiwanchinaandglobalsemiconductorsecurity AT schellorville silicontriangletheunitedstatestaiwanchinaandglobalsemiconductorsecurity |