Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND, National Defense Research Institute
[2023]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Research report
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034267602&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Abstract: | "From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission." |
| Umfang: | xvii, 160 Seiten Diagramme 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781977410443 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Staying the unfavorable course |b National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |c Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans, Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, Richard S. Girven |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a National Security Council Decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| 246 | 1 | 0 | |a unfavourable |
| 264 | 1 | |a Santa Monica, Calif. |b RAND, National Defense Research Institute |c [2023] | |
| 300 | |a xvii, 160 Seiten |b Diagramme |c 23 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Research report | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2016: A Brief Overview -- Chapter Three: The Memory of 9/11 and the Psychology of Decisionmaking in Afghanistan -- Chapter Four: Bureaucratic Dynamics and the Structure of the Policy Process -- Chapter Five: Civil-Military Relations -- Chapter Six: The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Policy Process -- Chapter Seven: Conclusions | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission." | |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Prävention |0 (DE-588)4076308-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Afghanistankrieg |g 2001-2021 |0 (DE-588)4997894-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Sicherheitspolitik |0 (DE-588)4116489-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Elfter September |0 (DE-588)4667841-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Geheimdienst |0 (DE-588)4019737-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Terrorismus |0 (DE-588)4059534-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Afghan War, 2001-2021 / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a National security / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Terrorism / United States / Prevention | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Civil-military relations / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military policy / Decision making | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States / Military policy / Decision making | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Civil-military relations | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military policy / Decision making | |
| 653 | 0 | |a National security | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Terrorism / Prevention | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States | |
| 653 | 4 | |a 2001-2021 | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Afghanistankrieg |g 2001-2021 |0 (DE-588)4997894-9 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Elfter September |0 (DE-588)4667841-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Sicherheitspolitik |0 (DE-588)4116489-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Terrorismus |0 (DE-588)4059534-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 5 | |a Prävention |0 (DE-588)4076308-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 6 | |a Geheimdienst |0 (DE-588)4019737-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 7 | |a Geschichte |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Campbell, Jason H. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1189746522 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Evans, Alexandra T. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1229697292 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a McCulloch, Caitlin |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1252358318 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Reimer, Jordan R. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1204645701 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Girven, Richard S. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1161674934 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034267602&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 0905 |g 581 |
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| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034267602 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818990679150297088 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Sargent, Matthew Campbell, Jason H. Evans, Alexandra T. McCulloch, Caitlin Reimer, Jordan R. Girven, Richard S. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1217627588 (DE-588)1189746522 (DE-588)1229697292 (DE-588)1252358318 (DE-588)1204645701 (DE-588)1161674934 |
| author_facet | Sargent, Matthew Campbell, Jason H. Evans, Alexandra T. McCulloch, Caitlin Reimer, Jordan R. Girven, Richard S. |
| author_role | aut aut aut aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Sargent, Matthew |
| author_variant | m s ms j h c jh jhc a t e at ate c m cm j r r jr jrr r s g rs rsg |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049004472 |
| classification_rvk | MH 16094 ML 6300 |
| contents | Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2016: A Brief Overview -- Chapter Three: The Memory of 9/11 and the Psychology of Decisionmaking in Afghanistan -- Chapter Four: Bureaucratic Dynamics and the Structure of the Policy Process -- Chapter Five: Civil-Military Relations -- Chapter Six: The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Policy Process -- Chapter Seven: Conclusions |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1406818126 (DE-599)BVBBV049004472 |
| discipline | Politologie |
| era | Geschichte gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV049004472 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:58:12Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781977410443 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034267602 |
| oclc_num | 1406818126 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-11 |
| physical | xvii, 160 Seiten Diagramme 23 cm |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20240322 |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND, National Defense Research Institute |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Research report |
| spelling | Sargent, Matthew Verfasser (DE-588)1217627588 aut Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans, Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, Richard S. Girven National Security Council Decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 unfavourable Santa Monica, Calif. RAND, National Defense Research Institute [2023] xvii, 160 Seiten Diagramme 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Research report Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2016: A Brief Overview -- Chapter Three: The Memory of 9/11 and the Psychology of Decisionmaking in Afghanistan -- Chapter Four: Bureaucratic Dynamics and the Structure of the Policy Process -- Chapter Five: Civil-Military Relations -- Chapter Six: The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Policy Process -- Chapter Seven: Conclusions "From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission." Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 gnd rswk-swf Afghanistankrieg 2001-2021 (DE-588)4997894-9 gnd rswk-swf Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd rswk-swf Elfter September (DE-588)4667841-4 gnd rswk-swf Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd rswk-swf Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Afghan War, 2001-2021 / United States National security / United States Terrorism / United States / Prevention Civil-military relations / United States Military policy / Decision making United States / Military policy / Decision making Civil-military relations National security Terrorism / Prevention United States 2001-2021 USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Afghanistankrieg 2001-2021 (DE-588)4997894-9 s Elfter September (DE-588)4667841-4 s Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 s Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 s Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 s Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 s Geschichte z DE-604 Campbell, Jason H. Verfasser (DE-588)1189746522 aut Evans, Alexandra T. Verfasser (DE-588)1229697292 aut McCulloch, Caitlin Verfasser (DE-588)1252358318 aut Reimer, Jordan R. Verfasser (DE-588)1204645701 aut Girven, Richard S. Verfasser (DE-588)1161674934 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034267602&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Sargent, Matthew Campbell, Jason H. Evans, Alexandra T. McCulloch, Caitlin Reimer, Jordan R. Girven, Richard S. Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2016: A Brief Overview -- Chapter Three: The Memory of 9/11 and the Psychology of Decisionmaking in Afghanistan -- Chapter Four: Bureaucratic Dynamics and the Structure of the Policy Process -- Chapter Five: Civil-Military Relations -- Chapter Six: The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Policy Process -- Chapter Seven: Conclusions Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 gnd Afghanistankrieg 2001-2021 (DE-588)4997894-9 gnd Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd Elfter September (DE-588)4667841-4 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4076308-0 (DE-588)4997894-9 (DE-588)4116489-1 (DE-588)4667841-4 (DE-588)4019737-2 (DE-588)4059534-1 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_alt | National Security Council Decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 unfavourable |
| title_auth | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_exact_search | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| title_full | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans, Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, Richard S. Girven |
| title_fullStr | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans, Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, Richard S. Girven |
| title_full_unstemmed | Staying the unfavorable course National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans, Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, Richard S. Girven |
| title_short | Staying the unfavorable course |
| title_sort | staying the unfavorable course national security council decisionmaking and the inertia of u s afghanistan policy 2001 2016 |
| title_sub | National Security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 |
| topic | Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 gnd Afghanistankrieg 2001-2021 (DE-588)4997894-9 gnd Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd Elfter September (DE-588)4667841-4 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Prävention Afghanistankrieg 2001-2021 Sicherheitspolitik Elfter September Geheimdienst Terrorismus USA |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034267602&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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