Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition: Robotization of the Armed Forces
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA
RAND
[2023]
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-5 |
| Abstract: | The ultimate outcome of the 2022 war in Ukraine and its strategic and economic ramifications are yet to be determined. Arguably, Russia will have to rethink, reform, and rebuild its military while facing even more binding financial constraints under a new wave of sanctions and export controls. In this new environment, Russia's political and military leadership likely will have to prioritize some modernization programs and abandon others. In the past, some Russian military strategists have said that the country's military should not match its adversaries' capabilities; instead, it should seek an asymmetric response by developing capabilities that make its adversaries' high-tech weapon systems economically unjustifiable. In recent years, there seemed to be a growing consensus in Russia that artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics-enabling relatively cheap but capable force-might just be such an asymmetric response. Moreover, in the face of the unsatisfactory performance and low morale of the Russian troops in Ukraine, Moscow might see the robotization of the Armed Forces as a way to alleviate its dependence on manpower. The authors of this report look at Russian views of military applications of robotics and AI and study Russia's motivations for the development of these capabilities. They investigate the degree of autonomy that the Russian military would be willing to delegate to machines, and to what extent the military is willing to replace (rather than augment) human soldiers. Finally, they assess whether Moscow has delivered-or can deliver-on its robotization vision |
| Beschreibung: | Title from PDF document (title page; viewed March 14, 2023) "RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION "Prepared for EUCOM - U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND |
| Umfang: | x, 121 Seiten Illustrationen 28 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781977410672 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RRA1233-5 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049002124 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 230615s2023 xx a||| b||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781977410672 |9 978-1-977410-67-2 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.7249/RRA1233-5 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV049002124 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 084 | |a OST |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Marcinek, Krystyna |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1205830294 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition |b Robotization of the Armed Forces |c Krystyna Marcinek |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a Russia's Asymmetric Response to Twenty-First Century Strategic Competition |
| 246 | 1 | 0 | |a Russia's Asymmetric Response to Twenty-First Century Strategic Competition |
| 264 | 1 | |a Santa Monica, CA |b RAND |c [2023] | |
| 300 | |a x, 121 Seiten |b Illustrationen |c 28 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Title from PDF document (title page; viewed March 14, 2023) | ||
| 500 | |a "RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION | ||
| 500 | |a "Prepared for EUCOM - U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Moscow's Vision for the Robotization of the Russian Armed Forces -- Chapter Three: The Status of Robotization -- Chapter Four: Analysis and Outlook -- Chapter Five: Conclusions | |
| 520 | 3 | |a The ultimate outcome of the 2022 war in Ukraine and its strategic and economic ramifications are yet to be determined. Arguably, Russia will have to rethink, reform, and rebuild its military while facing even more binding financial constraints under a new wave of sanctions and export controls. In this new environment, Russia's political and military leadership likely will have to prioritize some modernization programs and abandon others. In the past, some Russian military strategists have said that the country's military should not match its adversaries' capabilities; instead, it should seek an asymmetric response by developing capabilities that make its adversaries' high-tech weapon systems economically unjustifiable. In recent years, there seemed to be a growing consensus in Russia that artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics-enabling relatively cheap but capable force-might just be such an asymmetric response. Moreover, in the face of the unsatisfactory performance and low morale of the Russian troops in Ukraine, Moscow might see the robotization of the Armed Forces as a way to alleviate its dependence on manpower. The authors of this report look at Russian views of military applications of robotics and AI and study Russia's motivations for the development of these capabilities. They investigate the degree of autonomy that the Russian military would be willing to delegate to machines, and to what extent the military is willing to replace (rather than augment) human soldiers. Finally, they assess whether Moscow has delivered-or can deliver-on its robotization vision | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Artificial intelligence / Military applications / Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Robotics / Military applications / Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military robots | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Drone aircraft | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Vehicles, Remotely piloted | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) / Military policy / 21st century | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) / Armed Forces / Robots | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Armed Forces / Robots | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Artificial intelligence / Military applications | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Drone aircraft | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military policy | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Military robots | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Robotics / Military applications | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Vehicles, Remotely piloted | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 4 | |a 2000-2099 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-5 |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034265285 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818990675117473792 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Marcinek, Krystyna |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1205830294 |
| author_facet | Marcinek, Krystyna |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Marcinek, Krystyna |
| author_variant | k m km |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049002124 |
| contents | Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Moscow's Vision for the Robotization of the Russian Armed Forces -- Chapter Three: The Status of Robotization -- Chapter Four: Analysis and Outlook -- Chapter Five: Conclusions |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV049002124 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7249/RRA1233-5 |
| format | Electronic Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03946nam a2200589 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049002124</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230615s2023 xx a||| b||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781977410672</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-977410-67-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.7249/RRA1233-5</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV049002124</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">OST</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Marcinek, Krystyna</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1205830294</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition</subfield><subfield code="b">Robotization of the Armed Forces</subfield><subfield code="c">Krystyna Marcinek</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Russia's Asymmetric Response to Twenty-First Century Strategic Competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Russia's Asymmetric Response to Twenty-First Century Strategic Competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Santa Monica, CA</subfield><subfield code="b">RAND</subfield><subfield code="c">[2023]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">x, 121 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen</subfield><subfield code="c">28 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from PDF document (title page; viewed March 14, 2023)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Prepared for EUCOM - U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Moscow's Vision for the Robotization of the Russian Armed Forces -- Chapter Three: The Status of Robotization -- Chapter Four: Analysis and Outlook -- Chapter Five: Conclusions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The ultimate outcome of the 2022 war in Ukraine and its strategic and economic ramifications are yet to be determined. Arguably, Russia will have to rethink, reform, and rebuild its military while facing even more binding financial constraints under a new wave of sanctions and export controls. In this new environment, Russia's political and military leadership likely will have to prioritize some modernization programs and abandon others. In the past, some Russian military strategists have said that the country's military should not match its adversaries' capabilities; instead, it should seek an asymmetric response by developing capabilities that make its adversaries' high-tech weapon systems economically unjustifiable. In recent years, there seemed to be a growing consensus in Russia that artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics-enabling relatively cheap but capable force-might just be such an asymmetric response. Moreover, in the face of the unsatisfactory performance and low morale of the Russian troops in Ukraine, Moscow might see the robotization of the Armed Forces as a way to alleviate its dependence on manpower. The authors of this report look at Russian views of military applications of robotics and AI and study Russia's motivations for the development of these capabilities. They investigate the degree of autonomy that the Russian military would be willing to delegate to machines, and to what extent the military is willing to replace (rather than augment) human soldiers. Finally, they assess whether Moscow has delivered-or can deliver-on its robotization vision</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Artificial intelligence / Military applications / Russia (Federation)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Robotics / Military applications / Russia (Federation)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Military robots</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Drone aircraft</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Vehicles, Remotely piloted</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Russia (Federation) / Military policy / 21st century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Russia (Federation) / Armed Forces / Robots</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Armed Forces / Robots</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Artificial intelligence / Military applications</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Drone aircraft</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Military policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Military robots</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Robotics / Military applications</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Vehicles, Remotely piloted</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Russia (Federation)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">2000-2099</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034265285</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049002124 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:58:08Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781977410672 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034265285 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | x, 121 Seiten Illustrationen 28 cm |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateSearch | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Marcinek, Krystyna Verfasser (DE-588)1205830294 aut Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces Krystyna Marcinek Russia's Asymmetric Response to Twenty-First Century Strategic Competition Santa Monica, CA RAND [2023] x, 121 Seiten Illustrationen 28 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia c rdamedia nc rdacarrier cr rdacarrier Title from PDF document (title page; viewed March 14, 2023) "RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION "Prepared for EUCOM - U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Moscow's Vision for the Robotization of the Russian Armed Forces -- Chapter Three: The Status of Robotization -- Chapter Four: Analysis and Outlook -- Chapter Five: Conclusions The ultimate outcome of the 2022 war in Ukraine and its strategic and economic ramifications are yet to be determined. Arguably, Russia will have to rethink, reform, and rebuild its military while facing even more binding financial constraints under a new wave of sanctions and export controls. In this new environment, Russia's political and military leadership likely will have to prioritize some modernization programs and abandon others. In the past, some Russian military strategists have said that the country's military should not match its adversaries' capabilities; instead, it should seek an asymmetric response by developing capabilities that make its adversaries' high-tech weapon systems economically unjustifiable. In recent years, there seemed to be a growing consensus in Russia that artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics-enabling relatively cheap but capable force-might just be such an asymmetric response. Moreover, in the face of the unsatisfactory performance and low morale of the Russian troops in Ukraine, Moscow might see the robotization of the Armed Forces as a way to alleviate its dependence on manpower. The authors of this report look at Russian views of military applications of robotics and AI and study Russia's motivations for the development of these capabilities. They investigate the degree of autonomy that the Russian military would be willing to delegate to machines, and to what extent the military is willing to replace (rather than augment) human soldiers. Finally, they assess whether Moscow has delivered-or can deliver-on its robotization vision Artificial intelligence / Military applications / Russia (Federation) Robotics / Military applications / Russia (Federation) Military robots Drone aircraft Vehicles, Remotely piloted Russia (Federation) / Military policy / 21st century Russia (Federation) / Armed Forces / Robots Armed Forces / Robots Artificial intelligence / Military applications Military policy Robotics / Military applications Russia (Federation) 2000-2099 https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-5 |
| spellingShingle | Marcinek, Krystyna Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Moscow's Vision for the Robotization of the Russian Armed Forces -- Chapter Three: The Status of Robotization -- Chapter Four: Analysis and Outlook -- Chapter Five: Conclusions |
| title | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces |
| title_alt | Russia's Asymmetric Response to Twenty-First Century Strategic Competition |
| title_auth | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces |
| title_exact_search | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces |
| title_full | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces Krystyna Marcinek |
| title_fullStr | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces Krystyna Marcinek |
| title_full_unstemmed | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition Robotization of the Armed Forces Krystyna Marcinek |
| title_short | Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition |
| title_sort | russia s asymmetric response to 21st century strategic competition robotization of the armed forces |
| title_sub | Robotization of the Armed Forces |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1233-5 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marcinekkrystyna russiasasymmetricresponseto21stcenturystrategiccompetitionrobotizationofthearmedforces AT marcinekkrystyna russiasasymmetricresponsetotwentyfirstcenturystrategiccompetition |