Reform for sale: a common agency model with moral hazard frictions

This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteiligte Personen: Lefebvre, Perrin 1985- (VerfasserIn), Martimort, David 1967- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2023
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge elements
Schlagwörter:
Links:https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009285605
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009285605
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009285605
Zusammenfassung:This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size
Beschreibung:Also issued in print: 2023. - Includes bibliographical references
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (78 Seiten)
ISBN:9781009285605
DOI:10.1017/9781009285605

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