Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Becker, Törbjörn I. (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2001
Series:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 01/92
Links:http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
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http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595/00777-9781451851595.xml
Abstract:Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper addresses this question empirically using primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of collective action clauses increases yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers. By implication, the perceived benefits from easier restructuring are at least as large as any costs from increased moral hazard
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
ISBN:1451851596
9781451851595