Conditional Lending Under Altruism:
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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person: Mourmouras, Alex (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2004
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 04/100
Links:http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431/01332-9781451852431.xml
Abstract:We analyze how the altruism of an international financial institution (IFI) towards its lowincome member countries (LICs) alters the effectiveness of its loans. We study IFI loans to a credit-constrained LIC. The IFI''s repayment policy is determined by the interplay of its concerns for the welfare of the loan recipient and its fiduciary responsibilities to creditor countries. If the IFI is unable to commit to repayment terms in advance, conditional loans are superior to unconditional loans. Thus, IFI altruism and the inability to commit are sufficient reasons to equip loans with conditions. Conditional loans produce an efficient allocation of resources, so altruism is not a fundamental reason that loans fail to increase welfare
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
ISBN:1451852436
9781451852431